

THE MORAL VALUE AND SELF-REGULATION OF RELATIONAL GOALS

BY

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THE MORAL VALUE AND SELF-REGULATION OF RELATIONAL GOALS

Thesis under the direction of Lara Kammrath, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology

The purpose of this paper is to examine a new theoretical phenomenon that we call “moral potency,” its connection to relational roles and relational goals, and the subsequent effect on self-regulation in relationships. Moral potency is defined as the product of the centrality of a goal to fulfilling the associated role and the moral value of the role. We propose that relational goals will have a higher degree of moral potency than non-relational goals, and that this increased moral potency will lead to greater self-regulatory success. Results showed that relational goals did have a higher degree of moral potency and show greater self-regulatory success, but this success is not a result of moral potency. Implications for future research within the identity, relationship, and moral literature are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

New mothers are under intense social pressure to breast-feed their newborns (Pickert, 2012). Imagine three mothers react differently to this pressure: Janice sees it as a nice thing to do, and makes an effort, but she also knows that supplementing with formula is a good way to deal with some of the inconveniences of nursing while working, so Janice nurses occasionally, but she also feeds her child formula when it is more convenient. Another mother, Marissa, really takes the message to heart, but she has a hard time producing enough milk to feed her baby, so she resorts to formula, despite the fact that she would really rather nurse. The third mother, Katelin, also really identifies with this message, so much so that she thinks that if she were to use formula, she would be a bad mother and an immoral person. She continues to nurse and refuses to supplement with formula, despite the fact that her milk isn't particularly nutrient-rich and her baby doesn't seem to be gaining weight. All three mothers have the goal to nurse their infants; however, the third mother has turned this relational goal into a *moralized* relational goal. She sees breast-feeding as central and necessary for her identity as a mother, which is central and necessary for her identity as a moral person. For Katelin, not nursing is not an option.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the phenomenon of morally potent relationship goals: that is, goals that are central to fulfilling relationship roles that are central to a person's moral identity. We hypothesize that self-regulation and goal pursuit will be more successful for morally potent goals than for non-morally potent goals, because of the moral weight that they carry. Furthermore, we hypothesize that

because morality is highly social, relational goals will have a higher degree of moral potency than will non-relational goals.


Moral Potency

This paper focuses on people's relationship roles (being a spouse, a parent, a friend, etc.), and the goals that are associated with these roles. We will compare the goals that are associated with relational roles to those associated with non-relational roles because we believe that there are important differences between them. One importance difference that we believe exists between relational roles and non-relational roles is moral potency. Moral potency is the combination of a particular goal's centrality to its corresponding role—how necessary this goal is to feeling like one has successfully fulfilled the role—and the moral value of that role—how central the role is to feeling like a moral person. See Figure 1. Our theoretical approach to this phenomenon is hierarchical—we believe that the best approach is to first address the contribution that relational goals make to the fulfillment of relational roles, and then to address the contribution that relational roles make to the attainment of moral selfhood. This approach is highly related to the approaches used by role researchers (McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1980).

Goal centrality. Each role that a person plays has several different goals associated with it—most roles are not defined by a single goal or behavior. Necessarily, some goals are more essential or central to role fulfillment than others. A goal's centrality is the degree to which a given goal is necessary or central to fulfilling the associated role. For

example, successfully defending one’s thesis is a highly central goal for the role of “graduate student.” Color coding one’s notes is a goal that is less central to the role.

Figure 1.
The theoretical model of Self-Attribute Potency.



Role identity theorists have argued that there are many different ways to fulfill any particular role. They have shown that individuals have their own idiosyncratic goals for each role, and there is variability among the goals that people believe are central to fulfilling the same role (McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stets & Burke, 2003). More generally, there are common guidelines that most people agree upon about what a teacher or parent or manager should do, but there is also a certain degree of agency that people exhibit within their roles—they make it their own, and have individual beliefs about the best way to fulfill each role. For example, two men may both wish to be “involved” and

“a provider,” in order to fulfill their role of “dad,” but one may see being a provider as more central than being involved, whereas the other father may feel the opposite (Burke & Reitzes, 1981).

A goal’s centrality should have a bearing on self-regulatory success—highly central goals should be pursued with more diligence than goals that are of less use and/or importance to fulfilling a particular role. It becomes a “need” vs. “want” scenario—goals with a low degree of centrality are likely only pursued *after* goals with a high degree of centrality are already met or being met (Burke & Reitzes, 1991).

Role Value. Everyone plays multiple roles in their everyday lives. According to role identity researchers, some roles are more important to a person’s overall sense of self than others (Stryker, 1980). At a more specific level, certain roles are more important to achieving certain self-attributes (e.g., seeing oneself as moral, seeing oneself as competent) than others. We term this phenomenon *role value*—it is the degree to which a certain role is instrumental to achieving a certain self-attribute. For example, a woman’s role as a mother likely has a high degree of moral value, and her role as a student likely has a high degree of competence value. In this paper, we are primarily concerned with roles that contribute to moral value, and we believe that relational roles will most likely lend themselves to having high moral value because relationships are inherently social, and the social domain is highly moralized (as we will discuss below).

We hypothesize that a role’s value should have a bearing on self-regulatory success – people are more motivated to successfully fulfill roles that are more important for self and identity (Stets & Burke, 2003). Furthermore, certain types of role value may be


more motivating than others. Specifically, we believe that moral value should be more motivating than other types of role value because once one has attained a moral identity, one is especially motivated to “make one’s actions consistent with one’s ideals” (Blasi, Noam, & Wren, 1993, p. 99).

Potency. Moral potency is the product of a goal’s centrality and the corresponding role’s moral value. We believe that the interaction of these two variables will contribute to motivation and self-regulation above and beyond their main effects because the combination of successful role fulfillment (by achieving a central goal) and achieving moral- (or competent) selfhood should be an especially powerful motivator. We have established theoretically why goals that have a high degree of centrality should show better self-regulatory success than goals that are not central to role fulfillment (successful role fulfillment is motivating), and that successful role fulfillment is key to achieving certain self-attributes (Burke & Stets, 1999). On their own, they both should motivate people, but the effect of goal centrality should be magnified by its interaction with role value (and vice versa). Specifically, we predict that morally potent goals should be the most motivating, and therefore the most successful goals. To illustrate this interaction, we have included a theoretical graph (see Figure 2).

We believe that moral potency will have a stronger effect on self-regulation success than other self-attribute potencies (e.g., competence potency) because there are certain characteristics that are unique to the moral domain, which we will describe below, that should lead to increased self-regulatory success. Because we expect relational roles to have higher moral value than non-relational roles, we expect

relational goals to have higher moral potency than non-relational goals, and therefore higher self-regulatory success.

Figure 2.
A theoretical graph of the interaction between Moral Value and Goal Centrality.



Moral Value of Relational Roles

As explained above, the moral value of a role is the degree to which a certain role helps a person to achieve moral selfhood. In this section, we will present research (both theoretical and empirical) describing the deeply social nature of morality. Because of this connection between morality and the social domain, we hypothesize that relational roles will show a higher degree of moral value than will non-relational roles, but there will likely be exceptions to this rule.

Relational roles. Research examining the origins and constructs underlying morality has revealed a predominantly social nature to morality. Because of this, the social domain (in comparison to other life domains) is likely to be highly moralized. As a

result, we hypothesize that relational roles will show a high degree of moral value — doing what is necessary to fulfill a particular relationship role should lead one to feel like s/he is a moral person, whereas failing at a relational role should lead one to feel like s/he is an immoral person.

Turiel (1983) has argued that morality is deeply social. In fact, others have gone so far as to argue that a man

[Growing] up in some solitary place without any communication with his own species...could no more think of his character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than the beauty of his own face...Bring him into society and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before (Smith, 2010, p. 162).

Additional support for this argument can be found in Haidt's (2007) paper summarizing the current state of moral psychology. In that paper, he states that most lay people's definition of morality would likely be "something to do with how people ought to treat each other," (p. 1001) and that even beyond rules about how to behave towards other individuals, morality extends to conceptualizations about how to behave within a group and towards members of other, competing groups. A more academic definition builds on the work of Emile Durkheim (2008) and argues that morality "binds and builds; it constrains individuals and ties them to each other to create groups that are emergent entities with new properties" (p. 1000). This purpose is consistent with other definitions, which state that morality is people "[forgoing their own] political and economic interests for the sake of [public] good" (Bloch, 1973, p. 75; Fortes, 1969).

The premise that morality has primarily a social function is supported by research examining the core concepts and constructs of morality. Being one of the first researchers to theorize about morality, Kohlberg (1971) argued that there are 6 stages of moral development. In the final stage, people are to be concerned with justice, reciprocity, and equality as well as respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. Although justice may not necessarily seem like a social construct at first, if we return to Haidt's lay definition of morality as "something to do with how people ought to treat each other," we find that justice fits this definition nicely, and that definition *is* social. Gilligan (1977, 1982) criticized Kohlberg's view, stating that care and sensitivity for the needs of others is also an important moral concern. Eventually, Kohlberg and his contemporaries (1983) stipulated that morality had two branches—justice and care (which consists of "charity, love, caring, brotherhood, or community" (p. 19). Care appears to be more social than justice from the outset—demonstrating concern for one's fellow (wo)man is an inherently social endeavor. Support for those core moral concepts (justice and care) can be found in research on both sacred values and moral convictions. Sacred values (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) are often things like the "welfare of family or country, or...commitment to religion, honor, and justice" (Atran & Axelrod, 2008, p. 222). These values largely touch on the two foundations of justice and care. In a similar fashion, research on moral convictions (Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Houston, 2001; others) has covered issues like abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment, and has found that they tend to be related to justice (more specifically, procedural justice).

Building on these theories, Graham and Haidt (2007), recently developed an empirically-derived moral taxonomy. They have found 5 moral foundations that people deeply value, although some are more widely valued than others. Their foundations include (a) harm/care, (b) fairness/reciprocity, (c) loyalty, (d) respect, and (e) purity/sanctity. Broadly defined, harm/care states that people shouldn't hurt one another and should care for those that are hurting, fairness/reciprocity states that everyone should be treated equally, loyalty states that people should remain loyal to their group (friends, family, country, etc.), respect states that people should respect and submit to authority, and purity states that some things are sacred and there are certain things and practices that one should avoid because they are disgusting (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). These foundations support and extend the earlier theoretical work done by Kohlberg, Gilligan, and others. Although different researchers and philosophies yielded different conceptualizations of what constitutes morality, one thing that all of the taxonomies have in common is their social content.

Finally, theoretical and empirical neuroscience research also supports the social nature of morality. Research examining the neural structure of morality shows that brain regions associated with social functioning (e.g., Theory of Mind, attributions of intentionality) are also activated during moral judgment tasks (see Greene & Haidt, 2002). It has also been argued that executive function (which is necessary for moral judgment and action) evolved as a response to increasing social complexity (Barkley, 2001). Reciprocal altruism and kin care are common examples used when discussing the evolution of morality (Trivers, 1971), and they show the same social structure—

biological and evolutionary evidence supports sociological and psychological assertions about the social nature of morality.

The research presented thus far demonstrates that morality revolves largely around social relationships—the way that people treat and relate to one another. Because of these findings, we believe that relational roles (e.g., being a parent, spouse, friend) should therefore be more moralized than non-relational roles (e.g., being a runner, a cook, an accountant).

Non-relational roles. If morality is “something to do with how people ought to treat each other,” one would expect non-relational roles to have less bearing on a person’s sense of his or her own morality. Indeed, role identities such as runner, cook, scrapbooker, or shoe enthusiast likely have a much smaller bearing on a person’s moral self-concept, because they are largely solitary — one does not need to have a relationship in order to fulfill any of these roles, and therefore one does not have to treat anyone in any particular way. That is not to say that non-relational roles have no bearing on other aspects of an individual’s self-concept; in fact, it is likely that roles connected to an individual’s work or hobbies are likely very central to his or her sense of self, resulting in, for example, a high degree of competence value.

Research on trait ratings indicates that relational roles may, in fact, carry more moral weight than non-relational roles. Peeters and Czapinski (1990) has found a dichotomy between trait words—some are primarily focused on the benefit (or harm) done to others, whereas other words are primarily focused on the benefit (or harm) for the self. Words used as examples of other-benefit/harm include honesty and

dishonesty, whereas words used as examples of self-benefit include words like clever and stupid. Words that correspond to other benefit (which seems inherently relational) tend to be moral, and words that correspond to self-benefit tend to be amoral. This happens because non-relational roles are personal and solitary, and thus don't get the extra moral weight of the relational domain.

Despite the fact that non-relational roles should tend to have less bearing on a person's sense of his/her morality, it is possible that these roles can be construed in a social manner, and therefore develop a degree of moral value. For example, some cooks may have a sense of obligation to use organic ingredients because they are concerned with the effects that processed foods can have on their loved ones. Similarly, a woman's role as scrapbooker may be subsumed by her role as mother, and she may see her scrapbooking as a way to create special memories for her family.

Although the premise of our argument is that morality is social, and therefore the social/relational domain is moralized, we acknowledge that there are several non-social (and therefore non-relational) domains that receive moral attention and concern. Early work in moral philosophy, as well as more recent empirical evidence points to the fact that there are non-social moral domains that deserve our attention here. Certain roles may carry a degree of moral value, despite the fact that they may not seem relational. More generally, the exceptions to the "morality is social" rule are usually seen in response to violations of the moral foundation of purity. Haidt and colleagues' (1993) model of moral judgment focuses mainly on appraisals of harm, which both affects and is affected by moral judgment. However, they also allow for the influence of

affect, which directly affects moral judgment—people can “feel” like something is wrong, even when there is no harm done (usually as a result of feelings of disgust, (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000; Haidt et al., 1993). Examples include things like consensual incest between adult siblings who use contraception, cannibalism of cadavers (not murder victims), and other similarly upsetting stories that don’t involve actual harm, but elicit similar feelings of “wrongness.” Exceptions to the “morality is social/relational” rule-of-thumb could thus occur in roles that revolve around the moral foundation of purity. For example, a kosher butcher may feel that his role has a high degree of moral value because kosher rules are related to purity, which is a common moral concern.

Despite the fact that there are certain non-relational roles and situations that elicit moral judgment and action, researchers argue that the majority of moral concern occurs in the social/relational sphere. We predict that the results of this study will show support for the theory that morality is largely relationally-driven and therefore relational goals will be more moralized than non-relational goals.

Hypothesis 1: Following the argument that morality is deeply social and full of rules about how to treat one another, we hypothesize that relational roles will have more moral value than non-relational roles.

Hypothesis 2: In consequence, relational goals will have higher moral potency than non-relational goals.

Moral Potency and Self-Regulation

Hypothesis 2 stated that goals central to relational roles should have higher moral potency than those for non-relational roles. We further predict that goals with a high degree of moral potency will show a great deal of self-regulatory success.

One reason that we believe that morally potent goals will be associated with increased self-regulatory success is that the combination of centrality to the role and (moral) value of the role causes the goal itself to be moralized. The moral domain has several unique characteristics that should contribute to self-regulatory success.

Research shows that the moral domain is unique in that it requires constant upkeep and diligence in order for a person to maintain the “moral” label (Gidron, Koehler, & Tversky, 1993; Reeder & Covert, 1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983). In 1979, Reeder & Brewer argued on theoretical grounds that morality is a hierarchically restricted trait domain; that is, one must often act in a moral way and (almost) never act in an immoral way in order to maintain moral standing. This theory was supported with empirical research in later years. Reeder and Spores (1983) found that as few as one moral violation can cause other people to judge the actor as an immoral person, and to believe that the actor is more likely to commit other, different moral violations in the future. Shortly thereafter, Reeder and Covert (1986) found that one immoral action can lead to a dramatic change in perception, especially if the actor previously had a moral reputation. Providing converging evidence, Gidron et al (1993) found that traits like honesty, “require a high relative frequency of behavioral manifestation before they are attributed” (p. 594). Conversely, traits such as dishonesty are attributed much more

readily. Because a single failure in the moral domain indicates a moral failing, people should view one or two failures to meet their morally potent goals as a de-facto revocation of their moral identity. This should lead to increased effort to meet their morally potent goals. In contrast, Gidron et al (1993) found that it was much easier to attain the attributions of “intelligent,” “wise,” and “brilliant”—one can exhibit fewer instances of these traits, and can exhibit more failings in these domains and still be considered quite competent. Goals with a high degree of competence potency should therefore be less motivating, because they require less diligence.

A second reason that we believe that morally potent goals will be associated with increased self-regulatory success is because during goal conflicts morally potent goals should trump other goals. Researchers who study goal conflict argue that moralized concerns pitted against non-moralized concerns create what are called “taboo trade-offs” (Tetlock et al., 2000). In a taboo tradeoff, people feel that choosing the non-moral option is not even an option worth considering—they do not even experience a conflict. Thus, if a goal is morally potent, when other goals conflict with it, it should often be viewed as a taboo tradeoff, and the person should choose the morally potent goal without even thinking about it. Conversely, goals with a lower degree of moral potency should not prompt taboo-tradeoff scenarios, because they aren’t as highly valued. Therefore, when non-morally potent goals are paired with other goals, goal conflict will arise, and goal conflicts interfere with goal pursuit (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). The taboo tradeoffs literature suggests that morally potent goals should result in fewer

experiences of goal conflict, which should in turn be associated with greater success in goal pursuit.

Moral vs. competence potency. Similar to moral potency, the *competence potency* of a goal is the centrality of the goal to fulfilling the role multiplied by the competence value of the role. We predict that any goal that is high in competence potency will show some degree of self-regulatory success, because being (and being seen as) competent is important to people (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). However, competence potency should not show the same sort of goal pursuit, commitment, or success that moral potency does, because competence potency should not show hierarchical restriction that moral potency does (Gidron et al., 1993). Additionally, choices involving competently potent goals should result in goal conflict, which shouldn't be seen in choices that involve morally potent goals. Thus, because morality has unique aspects not found in other domains including hierarchical restriction and taboo tradeoffs, self-regulation of morally potent goals will be unique. Specifically, we predict that morally potent goals will show more self-regulatory success than other goals.

Hypothesis 3. We predict goals with a high degree of moral potency will predict greater self-regulatory success than goals with a low degree of moral potency.

Hypothesis 4: Relational goals should be pursued with greater self-regulatory success than non-relational goals, due to the moral potency that is associated with relational goals that is not associated with non-relational goals.

The Present Research

The present research aims to test our hypotheses that relational roles will show more moralization than non-relational roles, that relational goals show better self-regulatory success than non-relational goals, and that this success will be due to the increased moral potency associated with relational goals. To do so, we will conduct two studies. Study 1 is a within-subjects correlational study that aims to test the hypothesis that people believe that their relational roles have greater moral value than their non-relational roles. Study 2 is a between-subjects correlational study that aims to replicate the findings from Study 1 and test the hypotheses that relational goals will have higher moral potency than non-relational goals, will exhibit greater self-regulatory success than non-relational goals, and that this relationship will be mediated by the increased moral potency of relational goals.

STUDY 1

The purpose of Study 1 is to determine whether individuals' relational role identities are more related to their sense of their moral selves than are their non-relational role identities. We propose that due to the relational nature of moral identity (Haidt, 2013); fulfilling or failing to fulfill relational role identities should have an effect on a person's moral identity. Conversely, we believe that non-relational role identities are not necessarily linked to individuals' sense of their moral identities, although they may be highly related to a person's sense of competence.

Methods

Participants. One hundred participants were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Participants were individuals who were residents of the United States in an exclusive, cohabiting, marital relationship and who have had children. Additionally, we ensured that participants were fluent in English. After eliminating participants who provided multiple nonsensical or incorrect roles (e.g., providing relational roles in the non-relational condition, providing non-relational roles in the relational condition), we were left with 90 participants. Participants were 72% female, 70% White, 13% African American, 10% Latino/a, 7% Other, *M* age = 37.37 years (*SD* = 11.25 years).

Identifying roles. After agreeing to participate, participants were asked to list three relational roles and three non-relational roles that they play in their daily lives. They were given examples of relationship roles (e.g., spouse, sister, parent) and non-relational roles (e.g., runner, accountant, shopaholic). Participants were then asked to answer the following question for each role "How important is [this role] to your sense

of self?” (0 Not at all important – 6 Extremely important). After dropping bad roles provided by participants who were not paying attention or didn’t follow the directions, there was an average of 5.38 roles per participant.

Self-Attribute value ratings. Participants then answered questions about how each of those role identities inform their moral and competent selves. They rated the item stems: “It is necessary for me to be a good [role] in order to be an [adjective] person” and “Being a bad [role] would make me an [adjective] person” with 12 adjectives, 6 related to the morality dimension (decent, moral, honorable, immoral, selfish, unethical) and 6 related to the competence dimension (competent, successful, capable, unskilled, incapable, untalented). Positively valanced words were included in the positive stem, and negatively valanced words were included in the negative stem. Items were rated on 0 (Strongly disagree) – 6 (Strongly agree) Likert scales.

Background measures. Participants also completed a battery of demographic, identity, personality, and relationship questionnaires at the end of their session. These scales are not germane to the current study, so they will not be discussed here.

Results

Descriptives. We first ran descriptive statistics to establish the mean levels of each type of value (moral, competence, and role importance). We found that the mean levels of these role values were lower than might be anticipated (see Table 1).

Table 1

Means and ranges for value type and role importance in relational and non-relational roles.

Role Rating	Relational Roles			Non-Relational Roles		
	<i>M (SD)</i>	Min	Max	<i>M (SD)</i>	Min	Max
Moral Value	1.21 (1.37)	-3	3	-.79 (1.90)	-3	3
Competence Value	.51 (1.64)	-3	3	.04 (1.68)	-3	3
Role Importance	5.38 (.92)	2	6	4.04 (1.39)	1	6

Roles and the moral self. Hypothesis 1 stated that relational roles would have more moral value than non-relational roles. Each participant rated 6 different roles (3 relational and 3 non-relational) for their degree of moral value and competence value. We analyzed these repeated measures data using a multi-level approach with roles nested within person. Model 1 tested the effect of role type on moral value. We found that relational roles were rated as having significantly more moral value than non-relational roles, $B = 1.97$, $t(403) = 16.39$, $p < .001$. Model 2 tested the effect of role while controlling for the rated importance of the role. We found that rated importance was a significant predictor of moral value $B = .61$, $t(471) = 11.43$, $p < .001$. Nevertheless, role type still remained a highly significant predictor of moral value $B = 1.14$, $t(431) = 8.28$, $p < .001$.

Roles and the competent self. As a comparison to moral value, we also examined the effect of role type on competence value. We found that relational roles were rated as having significantly more competence value than non-relational roles, $B = .45$, $t(401) = 3.86$, $p < .001$. This effect appeared to be smaller than the role effect for moral value. Model 4 tested the effect of role type while controlling for the rated

importance of the role. We found that rated importance was a significant predictor of competence value $B = .50$ $t(464) = 9.21$, $p < .001$. In this model, unlike the results for moral value, the effect of role was dramatically changed by the inclusion of role importance. Role type became a marginally significant predictor in the opposite direction, $B = -.23$, $t(427) = -1.78$, $p = .076$. Thus, relational roles seemed to have a special relationship with moral value that they did not necessarily have with competence value.

Direct comparison of morality and competence value. To directly test difference of the effect of role type on moral vs. competence value, we restructured the data to have 3 levels: type of rating (moral vs. competence value) nested within role nested within person. We predicted value ratings using role type and value type and the Role Type X Value Type interaction. We also controlled for role importance. We found that there was a significant interaction between role type and rating type, $t(976) = 9.33$, $p < .001$. There was a significant simple effect of role type when participants were rating moral value, such that relational roles had higher moral value ratings than non-relational roles, $B = 1.08$, $t(1000) = 9.42$, $p < .001$. There was an opposite significant simple effect of role type when participants were rating competence value, such that relational roles had lower competence value ratings than non-relational roles, $B = -.30$, $t(908) = 2.74$, $p = .006$.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 showed strong support for Hypothesis 1. Relational roles did, indeed, show more moral value than non-relational roles, even when controlling for

the importance of the role. Additionally, Study 1 showed a difference in the effect of role for competence value. After controlling for role importance, non-relational roles became marginally significant predictors of competence value. We hoped to replicate these findings in Study 2, as well as extend their implications by testing self-regulatory differences between relational goals and non-relational goals, which we believed would be due to differences in moral potency.

STUDY 2

As was established in Study 1, relational roles are closely tied to people's moral selves. Since this is the case, we predicted that goals that are central to fulfilling relational roles are also moralized, and would have what we call high moral potency. The moral potency of a goal is the degree to which a certain goal is central to fulfilling a role, multiplied by the degree to which a person believes that the role is necessary to fulfilling their moral identity. Based on previous research on moral convictions and sacred values, we proposed moral potency would predict greater self-regulatory success, even more so than competence potency, and even when controlling for the importance of the role identity. Following that line of logic, we predicted that goals that are more central to fulfilling a relationship role would show greater self-regulatory priority (and thus success) than goals that are central to non-relational roles.

Methods

Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Participants were residents of the United States, in an exclusive, cohabiting, marital relationship and who have had children. Additionally, we ensured that participants were fluent in English. After eliminating participants who provided multiple nonsensical or incorrect roles (e.g., providing relational roles in the non-relational condition, providing non-relational roles in the relational condition), we were left with 156 participants. Participants were 73% female, 84.6% White, 6.2% African American, 7.2% Asian, 6.1% Native American, 4.5% Latino/a, 2.8% other (participants were able to choose more than 1 ethnicity), M age = 35.41 years ($SD = 9.79$ years).

Procedural overview. After agreeing to participate, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Participants in the *relational goals* condition were assigned to list five relational roles that they currently hold, and then to list 10 associated goals that they currently hold for those roles (e.g., goals that they have in their relationships with their spouse, children, friends, etc.). Participants in the *non-relational goals* condition were assigned to list several current non-relational roles that they currently hold, and then to list 10 associated goals that they currently hold for those roles (e.g., goals that they have at work, health/wellness goals, goals for their hobbies, etc.). After generating their list of goals, participants were asked a set of questions about each goal. Finally, participants answered demographic questions about themselves and their families. They were also given a battery of personality and relationship questionnaires which are not germane to the current study.

Role and goal generation instructions. Participants in the relational-goals condition were instructed to take a moment to think about different relationships in their lives that are important to them, and to list five of those relationships. Then they were asked to think about some goals and standards they have set for themselves and are currently pursuing in these important relationships. They were asked to list exactly 10 goals, with at least 1 goal per relationship role. Participants in the non-relational goals condition were instructed to take a moment to think about different role-identities in their lives that are important to them and to list five of those role-identities. They were instructed *not* to include any relationship roles in their list. Then they were asked to think about goals and standards they have set for themselves and are currently

pursuing in these important roles. They were asked to list exactly 10 goals, with at least 1 goal per role.

Role identity questions. Participants saw each goal presented to them a second time, and for each goal they first answered the question, “Please choose the role identity associated with this goal” (role identities that they provided were redisplayed for them to choose from).

Once participants described the role identity associated with the goal, they were then asked “How important is it to you to be a good [role]?” (0 Not at all – 6 Extremely), and then asked to rate their agreement with four statements: “It is necessary for me to be a good [role] in order to be a moral (competent) person” and “Being a bad [role] would make me an immoral (incompetent) person” (-3 Strongly Disagree – 3 Strongly Agree). For all MLM analyses, these scales have been re-scaled to match the other questions for conceptual consistency.

Self-regulation questions. Participants also reported their self-regulatory attempts and successes for each goal. In total, there were 10 self-regulation questions for each goal that we broke down into 3 separate subscales.

Success. The first subscale, which we called the “success” subscale, had 4 items: “How successful have you been at enacting this goal recently?”; “How often do you fall short of reaching this goal?” (reverse-scored); “How close is your actual current behavior to your goal?”; and “How well would you say you are currently doing at accomplishing this goal?”; $\alpha = .82$. All questions were rated on 7-point Likert scales (0 Not At All - 6 Extremely).

Strength. The second subscale, which we called the “goal strength” scale, had 3 items: “How strong is this goal for you?”; “How committed are you to this goal?”; and “How important is the goal for you?”; $\alpha = .943$. All questions were rated on 7-point Likert scales (0 Not At All – 6 Very).

Priority. The third subscale, which we called the “goal priority” scale, had 3 items: “I would sacrifice almost anything in order to succeed at this goal.”; “I care more about succeeding at this goal than I do about succeeding at other things.”; and “I would prioritize this goal over other important goals.”; $\alpha = .961$. All questions were rated on 7-point Likert scales (0 Completely Disagree – 6 Completely Agree). We used the strength and priority factors to predict the success factor.

Goal centrality questions. Goal centrality is the degree to which a goal is instrumental to role fulfillment. We measured it using the following question: “Is accomplishing this goal necessary for you to consider yourself a good [role]?” These questions were rated on 7-point Likert scales from 0 (Not at all necessary) - 6 (Extremely necessary).

Background measures. Lastly, participants completed the same personality and demographic questionnaires as in Study 1. These measures are not germane to this study, so they will not be discussed.

Results

Data quality. Although we recruited 200 participants, several of these people did not follow directions, or provided goals or roles that were unusable for this study (nonsense items or direct repeats of previous goals, etc.). After cleaning the data, we

had an N of 156, with 1454 total goals, indicating an average of 9.32 usable goals per participant. Although they were instructed to, not all participants listed a goal for each role identity. On average, there were 4.69 unique roles per participant.

Descriptives. We first ran descriptive statistics to establish the mean levels of each type of value (moral, competence, and role importance), as well as the mean levels of potency and the self-regulation variables. See Table 2.

Table 2

Mean levels of role and goal ratings for relational and non-relational roles

Rating	Relational Roles			Non-Relational Roles		
	<i>M (SD)</i>	Min	Max	<i>M (SD)</i>	Min	Max
Associated Role Importance	5.27 (1.09)	1	6	4.62 (1.25)	1	6
Associated Role Moral Value	1.17 (1.62)	-3	3	-.74 (2.11)	-3	3
Associated Role Competence Value	.81 (1.73)	-3	3	.07 (1.86)	-3	3
Goal Centrality	3.62 (1.61)	0	5	3.97 (1.19)	0	5
Moral Potency	4.46 (6.75)	-15	15	-2.50 (8.89)	-15	15
Competence Potency	3.27 (7.12)	-15	15	.98 (7.69)	-15	15
Goal Success	4.37 (1.20)	0	6	4.40 (1.29)	0	6
Goal Priority	4.09 (1.70)	0	6	3.06 (1.79)	0	6
Goal Strength	5.1 (1.18)	0	6	4.82 (1.16)	0	6

Roles and the moral self. Hypothesis 1 stated that relational roles would have more moral value than non-relational roles. This hypothesis was supported in Study 1, and we replicated this effect in Study 2. Participants rated their 5 different role-identities (either relational or non-relational) for their degree of moral value and competence value. We analyzed these repeated measures data using a multi-level approach with roles nested within person. Model 1 tested the effect of role type on

moral value. We found that relational roles were rated as having significantly more moral value than non-relational roles, $B = 1.86$, $t(152) = 8.03$, $p < .0001$. Model 2 tested the effect of role while controlling for the rated importance of the role. We found that rated importance was a significant predictor of moral value $B = .67$, $t(661) = 16.35$, $p < .001$. Nevertheless, role type still remained a highly significant predictor of moral value $B = 1.45$, $t(157) = 6.86$, $p < .001$.

Roles and the competent self. As a comparison to moral value, we also examined the effect of role type on competence value. Model 3 tested the effect of role type on competence value. We found that relational roles were rated as having significantly more competence value than non-relational roles, $B = .66$, $t(157) = 2.84$, $p = .005$. This effect appeared to be smaller than the effect for moral value. Model 4 tested the effect of role while controlling for the rated importance of the role. We found that rated importance was a significant predictor of competence value $B = .53$, $t(657) = 13.16$, $p < .001$. Once role importance was included in the model, there was no longer a significant association between relationship type and competence value, $B = .34$, $t(161) = 1.55$, $p = .123$.

Direct comparison of moral and competence value to the self. To directly test the difference between the effect of role type on moral vs. competence value, we restructured the dataset to have 3 levels: type of rating (moral or competence value) nested within role nested within person. We found that there was a significant interaction between role type and rating type, $B = -1.25$, $t(1460) = -9.52$, $p < .0001$. There was a significant simple effect of role type when participants were rating moral

value, such that relational roles had higher moral value ratings than non-relational roles, $B = 1.88$ $t(1460) = 8.62$, $p < .0001$. There was similar significant simple effect of role type when participants were rating competence value, such that relational roles had higher competence value ratings than non-relational roles, $B = .63$ $t(1460) = 2.88$, $p = .004$, but this effect was significantly weaker than the effect for moral value.

Roles and moral potency. In hypothesis 2, we predicted that relational roles would have higher moral potency than would non-relational roles. To test this hypothesis, we created a dataset with 10 goal lines per participant, which we analyzed using a 3-level model: goal nested within role nested within person¹. To examine the moral potency of each goal, we multiplied the degree to which the goal was necessary for participants to consider themselves a good [role] and the degree to which being a good [role] makes them feel like a moral person. We did not center these items before we created the interaction term because centering would make goals that have very low centrality and roles with very low value ratings have equal moral potency as those with very high centrality and value ratings. It is therefore theoretically necessary to use uncentered product terms.

Next, we tested the relationship between role type and moral potency. Although it may seem that this test is redundant because we had already established that relational roles have a higher degree of moral value than non-relational roles, we planned to use moral potency as a mediating variable, and therefore needed to establish the relationship between moral potency and role type with certainty. A multi-

¹ All three- and four- level multi-level models in this study were analyzed using the simplified proc hpmixed method in SAS. Two-level models were analyzed using the “mixed” procedure in SPSS.

level model testing the relationship between role type and moral potency showed that relational roles did indeed have more moral potency than non-relational roles $B = 8.94$, $t(1452) = 5.8$, $p < .0001$. We found that role importance was a highly significant predictor of moral potency, $B = 4.73$, $t(1451) = 15.01$, $p < .0001$. This relationship did not, however, mediate the effect of role type on moral potency, $B = 5.79$, $t(1451) = 4.2$, $p < .0001$.²

Roles and competence potency. A multi-level model testing the relationship between role type and competence potency showed that relational roles had marginally more competence potency than non-relational roles, $B = 2.14$, $t(1452) = 1.37$, $p = .17$. We found that role importance was a highly significant predictor of competence potency, $B = 4.10$, $t(1451) = 13.15$, $p < .0001$, and this effect entirely mediated the relationship between role type and competence potency, $B = -.58$, $t(1451) = -.41$, $p = .683$.

Direct comparison of moral and competence potency. To directly test the interaction between role type and potency type to determine whether relational roles have higher moral or competence potency, we restructured to have four levels: type of potency (moral vs. competent) nested within goal nested within role nested within person. Using role type, potency type, and their interaction term as predictors, we found that there was a significant interaction between role type and potency type on degree of potency, $B = -7.82$, $t(1460) = -10.38$, $p < .0001$. There was a significant simple effect of role type when participants were rating moral potency, such that relational

² Because role type was a significant predictor of moral value, we fully expected this result—if role type predicts one part of moral potency, it should predict moral potency. When we added the moral value of the role into the model, the relationship between role type and moral value completely explained the original positive relationship between role type and moral potency, although the role's moral value, $B = 6.2$, $t(1451) = 46.05$, $p < .0001$, remained a significant predictor of moral potency, as would be expected.

roles had higher moral potency ratings than non-relational roles, $B = 10.23$, $t(1460) = 4.87$, $p < .0001$. There was no simple effect of role type when participants were rating competence potency, $B = 2.42$, $t(1460) = 1.15$, $p = .251$.

Moral potency and self-regulation. In hypothesis 3, we predicted that goals with a high degree of moral potency would show greater self-regulatory success than goals with a low degree of moral potency. In this analysis, our DV was the self-regulatory success variable, which was the average of 4 self-regulation variables (How well you've done recently, how often you've failed recently-r, how successful you've been recently, and how close your actual behavior is to your ideal). We predicted this DV using moral potency (a product term) and its associated lower-order terms (moral value and goal centrality). Because our potency variables were created as products of uncentered lower-order terms, all models that use potency as a predictor are hierarchical — we analyzed the main effects of goal centrality and the moral/competence value of the role first, and then added the potency term to the model. We then added role importance to the model as a control. The following multi-level models are three-level models, with goals nested within roles nested within person.

When predicting the self-regulatory success of a goal, there was a significant main effect of the centrality of the goal, $B = .12$ $t(1451) = 5.78$, $p < .0001$, and a marginally significant main effect of the moral value of the role, $B = .04$, $t(1474) = 1.80$, $p = .072$. Contrary to our hypothesis, moral potency did not predict self-regulatory success, $B = .002$ $t(1450) = .23$, $p = .82$. Controlling for role importance did not meaningfully improve the relationship between moral potency self-regulation, although

role importance was a significant predictor of self-regulatory success, $B = .11$, $t(1449) = 2.89$, $p = .004$. Adding importance to the model fully mediated the effect of moral value $B = .006$, $t(1450) = .23$, $p = .818$, but did not affect the main effect of goal centrality, $B = .11$, $t(1450) = 5.17$, $p < .0001$.

Competence potency and self-regulation. We ran similar analyses looking at the degree to which competence potency predicted self-regulation success. When predicting the self-regulatory success of a goal, there was a significant main effect of the centrality of the goal, $B = .12$, $t(1451) = 5.56$, $p < .0001$, and a significant main effect of the competence value of the role, $B = .05$, $t(1451) = 2.17$, $p = .03$. Competence potency did not predict self-regulatory success, $B = .005$, $t(1450) = .51$, $p = .612$. Controlling for role importance did not improve the relationship between competence potency and self-regulation, although role importance was once again a significant predictor of self-regulatory success, $B = .1$, $t(1449) = 2.8$, $p = .005$. Adding importance to the model fully mediated the effect of competence value $B = .02$, $t(1450) = .94$, $p = .35$, but did not affect the main effect of goal centrality, $B = .11$, $t(1450) = 5.07$, $p < .0001$.


Because neither competence potency nor moral potency were significant predictors of self-regulatory success, we did not model them against one another.

Other self-regulation variables. Although moral potency and competence potency were not significant predictors of self-regulatory success, they might have predicted other self-regulatory factors, such as goal strength (the average of strength, importance, and commitment) or goal priority (willingness to sacrifice, priority, and

degree of care about the goal). However, neither moral nor competence potency showed any significant effects with either of these two self-regulation variables.

Role type and self-regulation. In hypothesis 4a, we predicted that relational goals should be pursued with greater self-regulatory success than non-relational goals. As predicted, relational goals showed higher behavioral success than non-relational goals, $B = .36$, $t(1452) = 2.96$, $p = .003$. Relational goals also showed higher goal priority, $B = 1.06$, $t(1452) = 6.23$, $p < .0001$, and goal strength $B = .31$, $t(1452) = 2.74$, $p = .006$. The relationship between role type and success was mediated by goal priority and strength (see Figure 3). The relationship between role type and self-regulatory success was also partially mediated by role importance $B = .13$, $t(1, 1451) = 4.10$, $p < .0001$, but role type remained a significant predictor when role importance was in the model, $B = .28$, $t(1451) = 2.33$, $p = .02$.

Figure 3.
The Mediation of the Relationship between Role Type and Self-Regulatory Success.



In hypothesis 4B, we predicted that moral potency would mediate the relationship between role type and self-regulatory success. Given that moral potency showed no relationship to self-regulatory success, we did not expect this hypothesis to be supported, and indeed, it was not. To test this mediation, first we predicted self-regulatory success from role type. Next, we added the main effects of goal centrality and role moral value. Finally, we added the moral potency interaction term. Results showed that adding the main effects of goal centrality, $B = .13$, $t(1450) = 6.09$, $p < .0001$

and moral value of the role, $B = .01$, $t(1450) = .65$, $p = .514$, slightly improved (rather than mediated) the association between role type and self-regulatory success, $B = .38$, $t(1450) = 3$, $p = .003$. Adding moral potency to the model did not change the relationship between role type and self-regulatory success, $B = .38$, $t(1450) = 3.01$, $p = .003$.

The above analyses of role type and self-regulation indicate that hypothesis 4A was supported but hypothesis 4B was not supported. People did self-regulate more successfully for their relational goals, but this was not because of the moral potency of those goals. Relational goals had higher goal priority and goal strength, and this finding explains the higher self-regulation success seen for relational goals, but it isn't possible from this dataset to determine why relational goals are more strongly motivated.

Discussion

This study replicated the original findings from Study 1 that showed that relational roles were more moralized than non-relational roles. It also extended these findings to show that relational goals had higher moral potency and that relational goals showed better self-regulation. However, we did not find the expected relationship between moral potency and self-regulation, nor did we find the expected mediation of role type by moral potency. This leaves the question of why people are more motivated to achieve their relational goals than their non-relational goals unanswered, as people seem to self-regulate better towards their relational goals regardless of their importance. Other potential mediators may be addressed in future research.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results from these studies give us new insight to relationships, moral identity, and self-regulation. Across two studies, we demonstrated that relational roles have more moral self value than non-relational roles. This effect remained even when controlling for role importance and as a comparison to competence value, and these results support previous research indicating that morality is deeply social/relational. The results show us that relational roles and relational goals carry a higher degree of moral value than non-relational goals, and this relationship is special — it is not just that relational roles are more important — participants did report a higher degree of importance for relational roles, but this does not explain the link between relational roles and moral identity. Furthermore, this link is not simply that people see relational roles as being more closely tied to all positive self-attributes of their identity — in study 1, we found that people actually rated non-relational roles as being more closely tied to their competence identity, indicating that there is something unique occurring between moral selfhood and relational role fulfillment (although it is possible that this finding was a type 1 error that will not replicate in other studies, as it was not replicated in Study 2).

This link has never been shown before, and it gives us insight into several different avenues that are of interest to psychologists. Moral character, judgment, and concerns are a hot topic within the field at the current moment, and this new finding may open up new lines of research—why does relational role fulfillment make people feel like they are achieving moral selfhood? Can we promote more moral behavior by

manipulating the way that people see their relationships to strangers and acquaintances? Do people who have fewer relationships or lower-quality relationships feel like they are less moral people than those with several strong relationships?

Furthermore, our second major finding from Study 2 showed that people are better self-regulators for their relational goals than their non-relational goals. Despite the fact that intuition might lead people to believe that family and friends take a back seat to non-relational life domains, our results indicate that people find relational goals more motivating and find a way to be more successful in their relational goals than in their non-relational goals. The self-regulatory success that occurs for relational goals is due to the added priority and strength given to relational goals—people value these goals more than their non-relational goals, even if the non-relational goals are also very important to them (and even when controlling for the importance of the associated role). This difference is an important one that requires further examination. If people view their relational roles as having more strength and priority, and therefore more success, why do so many marriages crumble, and why do so many children have such bad relationships with their parents? A future line of research may want to examine couples together — they can each provide the researchers and their partners with a list of goals they are trying to accomplish within the relationship, and partners can rate each other's success. This finding may be a perception issue — if the participant's goal is to always provide a shoulder to lean on, but his or her partner does not experience that support, the participant and his/her partner may report wildly different success rates.

Also interesting to note, many individuals, especially men, listed “provider” as a relational role and felt that earning enough money to pay the bills and to provide their families with all of the material things that they want are relational goals, but these people’s relationship partners may view them as non-relational goals. This difference in construal may explain some of the conflicts that arise in family relationships — men see a *moral* obligation to their families to provide the best life possible (through financial security), but their families often want more face time.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that relational goals showed both more moralization and better self-regulation than non-relational goals, our moral potency hypothesis was incorrect. Furthermore, moral value, competence value, and competence potency show the same null effect on goal success, goal strength and goal priority. This is highly surprising, because previous literatures have shown that people are highly committed to moral convictions and sacred values, and we would have predicted that moralized goals would show the same pattern of commitment and success in this experiment. The null finding for priority and commitment is perhaps even more unexpected—all past literature indicates that people are incredibly, and occasionally even unreasonably, committed to their moral concerns. Additionally, previous research has shown that people are highly concerned with both role fulfillment and positive self-attribute attainment, so the idea that goals that are valuable for both do not predict self-regulatory success is quite surprising. While it is true that competence and moral value were significant (and marginally significant, respectively) predictors of self-regulation, this effect was entirely mediated by role importance, which

indicates that it is not the specific role value that is predictive, but rather the overall value to the self (the role importance).

This null finding could have arisen for many possible reasons. One possibility is that while relational goals have a higher degree of moral value, they do not achieve the same level of commitment that is seen for moral convictions or sacred values—they matter more than non-relational goals, but that isn't enough to push people to exert extra effort to self-regulate toward those goals. Another possibility is that a subset of our participants were unwilling to admit self-regulatory failures for social desirability reasons, and that a person's social desirability or guilt/shame proneness score may mediate this relationship.

In light of previous research, and the links between relational goals and moral selfhood and relational goals and self-regulatory success, we think that the potential for moral potency as a predictor of self-regulation may still exist. Future studies may want to be more specific in goal generation instructions (e.g., only asking for concrete goals like “running every morning before work,” or “attending all of my daughter's dance recitals”), and may even want to include a rank-order question where participants must rank their goals in order of value, and then only use the top 1-5 goals for analysis. Additionally, single self-report may not be the best way to measure self-regulatory success. Future studies may want to use agreement data from friends or family members, or may be better served by using a longitudinal method whereby participants rate their success on each goal repeatedly over several days or weeks.

Limitations

One major limitation of this paper is the self-report nature of our design. Although this is commonly used in self-regulation studies, any findings that arise from self-reports of self-regulation must be taken with a grain of salt. A preferable method would involve multiple reports (e.g., obtaining reports from friends and family members), or a more objective measure of goal pursuit. Unfortunately, an objective measure of some of these goals is all but impossible. Another potential flaw is the fact that several of the relational goals that participants generated were very general/global (e.g., “always be loving,” “always be understanding,” “always be supportive,”), and it may be difficult to reasonably assess these goals in an objective fashion—participants may gloss over or rationalize failures in these arenas, but this is harder to do with more concrete goals like “run every day” or “be on time to my volunteer position.” Future studies that examine goals may want to specify construal levels.

Future Directions

Future research should focus on understanding the association between relational goals and self-regulatory success. Study 2 demonstrated that relational goals are more successful than non-relational goals, but this effect is not explained by moral potency, as we had proposed. It is possible that this relationship is moderated by individual differences in personality. For example, individuals high in unmitigated communion may be driving the relationship between relational roles and self-regulation. Additionally, factors like a tendency to answer in a socially desirable way, or a proneness to guilt and shame may be masking the relationship between moral

potency and self-regulatory success. Controlling for these effects may cause this relationship to emerge. We plan to examine these potential mediations in the future.

Other research may want to focus on more observational measures of self-regulatory success of relational goals—people may report that they are succeeding at not “doing the dishes” (for their children, whose chore it is) or “letting [their wife] control the remote,” or “always being understanding” but their relationship partners may have a different take on their behavior. We propose a dyadic study in which participants exchange a list of relational goals and then rate themselves and their partners on self-regulatory success of these goals over a certain period of time (e.g., 2 weeks) and then researchers will assess the degree of agreement between both members of the couple—does your partner think you are as successful at your relational goals as you do? This study may have important implications for things like relationship satisfaction and likelihood of divorce.

Concluding Remarks

Despite the fact that we could not explain the relationship between relational goals and self-regulation, these studies demonstrated that relational roles are viewed as more moral and more motivating than non-relational roles. Although other research supports these findings, this study is the first to examine this link directly. These findings open up new and exciting lines of research into identity, relationships, and self-regulation and could provide interesting insight into existing questions.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Alicia Beth Jenkins

Education

M.A., Psychology – Anticipated graduation date May, 2013- *Cum Laude*
Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC

B.A., Psychology, December 2010- *Summa Cum Laude*
Barrett, the Honors College & the New College of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences,
Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ

Research Experience

Graduate Research Assistant, August 2011-Present
The Character Project, Wake Forest University
Duties include: Designing and conducting experiments, entering, analyzing,
interpreting, and writing up data, presenting research.

Tutor, Fall 2011
Wake Forest University Athletic Center

Sr. Research Associate/Lab Manager, October 2009-May 2011
Undergraduate Research Assistant, April 2009-October 2009
Law and Social Psychology Research Group, Arizona State University
Duties include: Maintaining the laboratory schedule, collecting, entering,
analyzing, and interpreting data, developing research questions and designing
future research studies, presenting research at the American Psychology-Law
Society and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology conferences

Undergraduate Research Assistant, August 2010-December 2010
CARMA Lab, Arizona State University
Duties include: Collecting and entering data, participating in material generation,
designing future studies.

Obama Scholars Mentor, October 2009-May 2010
Arizona State University
Duties include: Meeting with incoming freshmen scholarship recipients to
discuss academic progress and resources, ensuring that the students are
completing the requirements of the scholarship, referring students to campus
resources

Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Spring 2009

PSY 290 Research Methods- Dr. Nicholas Schweitzer, Arizona State University
Duties include: Grading assignments, answering student questions, helping to develop SPSS assignments

Undergraduate Research Assistant, August 2008-April 2009

Legal Psychology Research Group, Arizona State University
Duties include: Collecting and entering data, maintaining lab schedule, presenting research at the Academic Expo.

Awards

Barrett Honors College, Thesis Project Grant, Spring 2010

Barrett Honors College, Honors Project Grant, Fall 2009

Rimmer Family Scholarship, Fall 2009, Spring 2010

3rd Place Research Award – Arizona State University Academic Expo 2008

Provost's Scholarship, 2007-2010

Dean's List

Service

Honors Council Representative, Psychology Department, Wake Forest University, 2011-present

Scholarly Works

Fleeson, W., **Jenkins, A.B.**, Furr, R.M., Meindl, P., & Jayawickreme, E. (manuscript in prep-title and authorship subject to change). *Morality and personality: An experience-sampling study of HEXACO personality traits and moral behavior.*

Louis-McMahon, D., **Jenkins, A.B.**, & Schweitzer, N.J. (manuscript in prep-title and authorship subject to change). *Identifying the underlying motivations for rule-violating behavior.*

Jenkins, A.B., Jayawickreme, E., Meindl, P., Fleeson, W., & Furr, R.M. (2013). *Morality and personality.* Poster to be presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Jenkins, A.B., Jayawickreme, E., Meindl, P., Fleeson, W., & Furr, R.M. (2012). *When the Truth Hurts: How Emotional Sentiment Can Override Honesty.* Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Southeastern Social Psychologists, Gainesville, Florida.

Jenkins, A.B. (2012). *Morality and personality*. First Year Project Presentation at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC.

Jenkins, A.B., Baker, D., Roche, B., Saks, M.J., Schweitzer, N.J. (2011). *The perceived helpfulness of various forms of evidence in NGRI cases*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Miami, Florida.

Jenkins, A.B., Schweitzer, N.J. (2011). *Identifying the underlying motivations for rule-violating behavior*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, San Antonio, Texas.

Schweitzer, N.J., **Jenkins, A.B.** (2010). *Improving jurors' assessments of causal relations in scientific evidence*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychology and Law Society, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Jenkins, A.B. (2010). *Biting the apple: A factor analytic approach to identifying the underlying motivations for rule violations*. Undergraduate Honors Thesis, Arizona State University

McQuiston, D., **Jenkins, A.B.**, Jinn, H.R., Vandegriff, A. (2008). *How does perceptual fluency affect eyewitness confidence?* Poster presented at the Arizona State University Academic Expo, Phoenix, AZ.