

A PUBLIC AFFAIR: THE EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED MORALITY ON THE EXPRESSION
OF NEGATIVE GROUP DIRECTED ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

BY

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ABSTRACT

Previous work has shown that perceptions of immorality can lead to the expression of negative group directed attitudes. Therefore the present study investigated whether increased perceptions of morality could decrease explicit negative group directed attitudes. For Study 1, 262 participants received a manipulation intended to increase how moral, competent, or warm they perceived people from their opposing political party to be, then completed a measure assessing their explicit negative attitudes and behaviors towards the opposing political party. For Study 2, 163 participants received a similar manipulation and completed the same explicit attitudes measure, but also took an implicit attitudes measure towards the opposing political party. For both studies, participants who received the moral manipulation did not report lower negative attitudes than participants in the warmth, competence, or control conditions. However, perceived morality was the best predictor of negative explicit attitudes for both studies, while all perception types equally predicted negative implicit attitudes. Despite the lack of support for the primary hypotheses, the current work supports the argument that perceptions of morality play a strong, unique role in the public expression of negative group directed attitudes.

INTRODUCTION

In the last several decades, psychologists have documented significant decreases in explicit negative attitudes and prejudice for historically marginalized groups in the United States, including African Americans and LGBT people (Peters & van den Bos, 2008; Mucchi-Faina, Pacilli, Pagliaro, & Alparone, 2009). While only several decades ago public derogation towards some groups was a cultural and even legal norm, the heightened awareness of social justice has led to the emergence of egalitarian and fairness norms in the United States (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1999; Peters & van den Bos, 2008). For many, violating these fairness norms by explicitly voicing derogatory attitudes towards certain social groups is often perceived as negative, taboo, and has even become a social stigma (Peters & van den Bos, 2008).

Most people possess negative attitudes about social groups to some degree, but an awareness of these social norms, along with a variety of social pressures and intrapersonal values, often motivate people to keep negative group directed attitudes private (Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996; Nosek, 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998). However, these norms do not seem to apply to all social groups. For example, the KKK, Neo-Nazis, and terrorist groups routinely receive public criticism, backlash, and even aggressive opposition (Mucchi-Faina et al., 2009). Ideological groups, specifically political groups, also tend to receive fervent, uncensored public criticism, especially between members of opposing political parties (Carraro, Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010).

This criticism towards certain ideological groups, or groups like the KKK, is not necessarily perceived as a social taboo, but rather, is often expected and encouraged

(Peters & van den Bos, 2008). Overall, it appears that people tend to deem some social groups as publicly acceptable to derogate, while opinions of other groups must be kept private. The current study investigates this differential expression and suppression of negative attitudes towards different social groups, and suggests that perceptions of morality are a driving factor in whether an individual publicly expresses negative attitudes and behaviors towards a social group. We propose that when groups are perceived as immoral, people are more likely to publicly express negative attitudes towards the immorally perceived group, and may be more likely to endorse negative group directed behaviors.

Although perceiving a group as immoral may lead to the public derogation of a social group, it is vital to note that this derogation is not inherently good or bad. In fact, publicly expressing a negative opinion, or publicly recognizing an immoral behavior, can lead to positive and necessary change. For example, many historical figures frequently praised as moral beacons, such as Martin Luther King, Gandhi, or the leaders of the American Revolution, publicly critiqued the establishment, instigating movements that led to increases in equality and wellbeing for previously oppressed social groups. Public criticism or opposition towards political parties is also an integral part of the checks and balances system, and is a means for the concerns of the public to reach the ears of the policy makers (Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Ryan, 2013). At a smaller scale, publicly voicing concerns about immorally perceived groups, such as the KKK, and avoiding these groups, likely serves to protect the safety of the individual and the community. In fact, recognizing immoral groups, and publicly revealing their potentially damaging

intentions and behavior, is likely an adaptive, and necessary part of being human (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013).

However, the public derogation of immorally perceived groups can also lead to potentially damaging consequences. For example, public bashing of minority groups, explicit prejudice, and explicit discriminatory behaviors influenced by perceived immorality likely do not promote individual, or group wellbeing. Additionally, constant ad hominem attacks directed towards ideologically dissimilar others likely do not enhance cooperation and efficacy in our societal institutions, but hinder it (Skitka et al., 2015, Ryan, 2013; Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009). Because the public expression of negative group directed attitudes is such a powerful tool, potentially leading to both constructive and destructive ends, it is vital to understand the attitude formation process, and the mechanisms that drive people to go public with their attitudes.

The attitude formation process has been extensively studied, especially in regards to the differences between explicit and implicit attitudes (Cooley, Payne, & Phillips, 2013; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Son Hing, Chun-Yang, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). An explicit attitude is an attitude that an individual is consciously aware of possessing, while individuals are less, or are not at all, consciously aware of their implicit attitudes (Dovidio et al., 2002). Additionally, people can possess explicit attitudes, but choose not to reveal them. Significant work has investigated why explicit attitudes are concealed or made implicit, but fewer studies have investigated the mechanisms that lead to the public expression of these explicit attitudes. Therefore, we are adding to the attitude literature, and propose that when a social group is perceived as immoral, people are more likely to publicly endorse negative attitudes and

behaviors towards that group. Likewise, we suggest that when a group is perceived as *more* moral, people are *less* likely to publicly endorse negative attitudes and behaviors towards that group. Potential mechanisms that drive this relationship will be discussed later in this paper.

The proposed relationship between perceived morality and the public endorsement of negative group directed attitudes is supported by recent findings in the literature, along with our previous work. Across numerous studies, it has been found that perceptions of immorality lead to the formation of negative group directed attitudes, and can cause people to more strongly endorse negative behaviors towards conflicting social groups (Brambilla, Hewstone, & Colucci, 2013; Howard & Masicampo, 2016a; Howard & Masicampo, 2016b; Skitka, Washburn, & Carsel, 2015). Due to the prominence of public attitude expression in politics, negative attitudes will be assessed between politically liberal and conservative social groups.

Explicit, Implicit, and Public Attitudes

Aside from perceptions of morality, multiple mechanisms have been proposed to explain why some attitudes are suppressed and implicit, while others are made explicit (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1992; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Nosek, 2007; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes). Because this study is investigating when explicit attitudes are made public, this review is going to focus primarily on processes that lead people to hide or express their explicit attitudes.

Earlier studies in the United States investigating the suppression of explicit attitudes were largely influenced by the decreases in explicit prejudice towards African Americans in the late 1970's and early 1980's, as measured by the modern racism scale

(McConahay, 1983; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981; Jetten et al., 1996; Plant & Devine, 1998). Although negative attitudes towards African Americans and other underrepresented groups tended to decrease on explicit measures, the development of implicit testing allowed psychologists to uncover that implicit negative attitudes and prejudice still remained high for some individuals (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Nosek, 2005; Plant & Devine, 1998). This led psychologists to question whether people were truly not consciously aware of their negative attitudes, or whether they were purposefully suppressing them. This mismatch between the explicit and the implicit was hypothesized by some psychologists to be the product of a strong social motivation to avoid endorsing negative attitudes and prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998)

In a study testing the reliability and validity of a new measure assessing the motivation to respond without prejudice, it was found that people possessed both internal motivations and external motivations to suppress negative group directed attitudes (Plant & Devine, 1998). When an individual possesses strong, self-inflicted values opposed to negative group attitudes or prejudice, that individual is exercising an internal motivation to keep negative attitudes private. For external motivations, attitudes are suppressed in order to gain social approval, or to avoid potentially negative evaluations or consequences from other people in the environment, especially if anti-prejudicial group norms are made salient. However, this motivation to suppress negative attitudes becomes less prominent if the group norms are accepting of the negative attitude (Plant & Devine, 1998).

Extending upon external motivations, further research has consistently found that group norms and social pressure play a prominent role in the suppression or expression of

negative group directed attitudes. According to Nosek (2005), the interpersonal factors of self-presentation and distinctiveness determine if explicit attitudes are expressed and match negative, implicit attitudes. Self-presentation involves the altering of a non-accepted attitude in a social situation in order to achieve a social or personal goal (Nosek, 2005; Nosek, 2007). For example, if an individual possesses strong negative attitudes about a certain ethnic group, but wants to impress his or her very politically correct boss, this negative attitude would be kept private.

Working in tandem with self-presentation, the distinctiveness of an attitude, or how an individual's private attitude compares to the attitudes of the people in the surrounding environment, largely contributes to whether less-accepted attitudes are shared (Nosek, 2005). If a person enters an environment in which his or her attitude concerning a social group or topic does not match the majority of the group, that person is more likely to publicly endorse attitudes in conflict with his or her implicit feelings. Because explicit attitudes may rely on the prevalent attitudes in any given social environment, the match between the implicit and explicit, and whether these explicit attitudes are shared, is largely context dependent, and not necessarily stable or fixed (Payne et al 2008; Nosek, 2005; Mähönen, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind & Finell, 2010).

Illustrating how attitudes in the surrounding environment impact whether a person's attitude is made explicit, one study assessed the interaction between adolescents' attitudes towards immigrants and group social norms (Mahonen et al., 2010). After manipulating whether group norms were perceived to be pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant, it was found that participants who possessed implicit negative immigrant attitudes only reported explicit negative attitudes when the group norm was to be anti-

immigrant (Mahonen et al., 2010). As found in previous studies involving self-presentation, the perceived normative pressure dictated whether people were willing to report negative attitudes (Mahonen et al., 2010; Nosek, 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998).

In addition to environmental factors, personal experiences and characteristics can also affect whether explicit attitudes are formed and/or publicly shared. Examining the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes in regards to people with intellectual disabilities, it was found that explicit and implicit scores were completely non-associated, and people possessed a slightly negative implicit bias towards intellectually disabled individuals (Wilson & Scior, 2015). However, females, participants who interacted with intellectually disabled individuals in the past, and participants who achieved higher educational status were less likely to express negative explicit attitudes about the intellectually disabled (Wilson & Scior, 2015). These study findings suggest that certain traits or life experiences along with interactions with the social group can lead to the absence or potential suppression of negative group attitudes, even when group norms are not made salient.

Further supporting self-presentation and adding to the individual differences that affect the formation and public sharing of explicit prejudice, one study found that self-monitoring (altering self-presentation to achieve a desired public image) can actually increase the public expression of negative attitudes (Klein, Snyder, Livingston, 2004; Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996). Participants discussed their attitudes regarding a social group either in front of an audience or to themselves, and were informed that the audience had either positive attitudes or negative attitudes towards the social group. It was found that only participants higher in self-monitoring were more

likely to publicly express negative group attitudes when the audience possessed negative attitudes about the social group (Klein et al., 2004). This study reveals that negative group attitudes are more likely to be publicly expressed when an individual who is highly motivated to please the social environment encounters others with similar attitudes. Due to the necessity of an ideal public image in politics, it may be that high-self monitoring politicians espouse greater anti-group fervor if they perceive their audience to be on a similar wavelength of attitude.

Central Role of Morality in Attitude Formation

Although self-presentation, self-monitoring, and group norms likely play a role in determining when attitudes are made explicit, all of these processes are dependent on the assumption that social norms and pressures largely determine the degree of shared explicit attitudes (Lambert et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2004; Mahonen et al., 2010; Nosek, 2005; Plant & Devine, 1998; Wilson & Scior, 2015). For all of these processes, when an attitude mismatch occurs between the individual and the majority, explicit attitudes are suppressed. However, it is clear that people continue to publicly derogate opposing ideological groups, even when the derogator is in the minority opinion (Carraro et al., 2010; Jacobson, 2016; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Pacilli, Rocco, Pagliaro, & Russo, 2016). From family Thanksgiving dinners to liberal guests on the *O'Reilly Factor*, it is clear that people still feel a need to explicitly express their negative attitudes about opposing political groups, even when the given social norms are in conflict with their opinion. Overall, it appears that attitudes towards certain groups, especially ideological ones, are somewhat immune to social norms and self-presentations concern (Skitka et al., 2015; Pacilli et al., 2016; Ryan, 2013). Therefore, we propose that

perceptions of morality (when a target group is perceived as immoral), play a role in the public expression of explicit negative attitudes and behaviors towards social groups.

Perceptions of morality likely play such a central role in this public sharing of explicit attitudes, because more than other perceptual processes or core traits, perceptions of morality have been found to be highly influential in the person perception process, a process that largely influences how people form attitudes about others (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin, 2015; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Although morality is the perception of interest in this study, perceptions of warmth (defined as friendly and sociable), along with competence (defined as intelligent and skilled) will also be manipulated, as these perceptions have previously been supported as central trait components of person perception (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968).

The central role of morality in the person perception process is a relatively new finding compared to older, more traditional models of person perception (Cuddy et al., 2007; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin; Hartley, Furr, Helzer, Jayawickreme, Velasquez, & Fleeson, 2016). The Dual model, an early and still highly influential model, posits that warmth and competence traits determine both how a target individual is perceived, and the ensuing emotions, or attitudes that are formed about the target individual (Rosenberg et al., 1968; Fiske et al., 2002). However, recent studies have found that the moral components of warmth predict outcomes in attitude formation more strongly and uniquely than the sociable components of warmth (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016). In fact, moral psychologists have suggested that the original two dimensional model of warmth and competence be expanded to include

morality as a third, equally strong, if not stronger, dimension (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Ellemers, Pagliaro, Marreto, & Leach, 2008; Goodwin, 2015; Leach et al., 2007).

Additionally, our recent work has found that perceived immorality often uniquely predicts, or leads to, negative group directed attitudes more strongly than perceived incompetence and coldness (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a; Howard & Masicampo, 2016b). Therefore, perceptions of warmth and competence will be induced in order to determine if morality also uniquely influences the public sharing of explicit attitudes.

In addition to playing a central role in the person perception process, perceived morality, or the lack of morality, often leads to the formation of both positive and negative attitudes and impressions, and this pattern has been captured in a number of studies. In one such study, participants rated the importance of moral, warmth, and competence traits for numerous social relationships (Goodwin et al., 2014). It was consistently found that moral traits, above and beyond competence and warmth, were most predictive of knowing someone else's identity, more stable across various social situations, rated as more uniquely human, more desirable for friends and family to possess, more important for living a fulfilling life, and were most predictive of global character assessments of other people (Goodwin et al., 2014).

Replicating and adding to these findings, another study found that the perception of morality was the strongest predictor of whether an individual was liked, respected, and known (Hartley et al., 2016). After rating an acquaintance on a variety of traits, participants' perceptions of moral traits were consistently more telling than perceptions of competence or sociability (i.e., warmth). If morality is such a central and desirable component of identity, and people are more likely to form positive attitudes about those

who are moral, than it seems likely that the perception of immorality would increase negative attitudes towards the individual and increase the probability that that person would be avoided or experience discrimination. Likewise, if an individual's perceived morality was increased, this would likely increase the probability that the individual would be approached and valued in society.

Furthermore, Hartley et al. (2016) suggests that morality plays the most dominant role in person perception because out of all traits, it communicates the most beneficial information about the target to the perceiver. Indeed, Goodwin (2015) suggested that morality is the most important factor when forming interpersonal judgments because it reveals the intentions of the person, which is likely the primary goal of person perception. Although perceptions of warmth communicate friendliness, a prosocial trait, it is still possible for a person to be gregarious and nice on the surface, but possess dishonest and impure motives. Understanding whether a target is capable of following through on its intentions is the next step in perception, and competence and warmth traits communicate this ability. Although the latter perceptions are important aspects of the individual, knowing whether a target is harmful or helpful is most directly related to a person's wellbeing and survival, and therefore most central when forming an attitude about the target (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin, 2015). Following this logic, it may be that people perceived as moral are more likely to be sought after because they appear safe and helpful, while people perceived as immoral are more likely to be avoided or derogated because they appear dangerous or harmful (Goodwin, 2015; Gray & Wegner, 2009). Therefore, at an intergroup level, groups perceived as immoral may also experience avoidance and derogation.

In fact, this premise, that immorally perceived groups appear harmful or dangerous, is central to the current study: if immoral groups are perceived as dangerous, it may be that other groups feel a sense of urgency or obligation to communicate to the public the potential harm of the immorally perceived group. Unlike other groups one may possess negative attitudes towards, immoral groups are likely perceived to pose a threat to wellbeing, and this threat acts as the justification or motivation that moves people to publicly express their negative attitudes (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin, 2015; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Of course, this “justification” to publicly derogate could very likely be a non-conscious process. To illustrate how morality can produce explicit negative and positive attitudes at the group level, the following section will provide literature documenting the effects of morality on intragroup and intergroup relations.

Perceptions of morality between and within groups. As previously discussed, numerous studies have found that perceptions of morality influence attitude formation at the intergroup level, in which groups perceived as immoral are disliked, and those perceived as moral are valued (Goodwin, 2015; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Koleva, et al., 2012; Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014; Skitka, Washburn, & Carsel, 2015). Illustrating the highly valued nature of morality above other traits at the group level, one study found that when various group norms were made salient, group members were more likely to work for the advancement of ingroup status when the ingroup communicated that it was the moral thing to do (Ellemers, et al., 2008). In contrast, significantly fewer participants worked for the advancement of ingroup status when it was the smart thing to do. These findings support our hypothesis regarding the power of morality: if people base their

judgments and intragroup behavior on moral group norms as opposed to competent norms, then it is likely that immoral perceptions, more so than competence perceptions, also play a prominent role in attitude formation, in which positive attitudes are formed for moral groups and negative attitudes are formed for immoral groups.

Further strengthening the argument that morality influences intergroup attitudes above and beyond other constructs, another study found that when judging fictional social groups, perceptions of morality affected “liking ratings” towards groups more strongly than perceptions of competence or warmth, with highly moral groups liked the most, and highly immoral groups liked the least (Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; Cuddy et al., 2008; Cuddy et al., 2007). Additionally, if groups perceived as moral are already liked more than groups perceived as competent and warm, than it seems likely that increasing the perceived morality of a social group should increase positive attitudes towards that group, decreasing the potential for the public expression of negative group attitudes.

Further supporting the connection between morality and attitude formation, a study found that outgroup directed hate was significantly higher for morality-based groups, such as pro-abortion or religious groups, than for non-morality based groups, such as fans of a sports team (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Although both types of groups expressed highly positive, loving, attitudes for ingroup members, only groups with a moral underpinning expressed strong negative emotions for social groups with opposing moral opinions. The results suggest that non-morality based groups are formed due to mutual love for an interest or hobby, whereas moral groups, in part, are formed in order to buffer the potential harmful actions of dissenting outgroups (Parker & Janoff-

Bulman, 2013). This study strengthens several arguments relevant to our hypotheses. First, that moral perceptions indicate whether an individual or group intends to produce harm, and second, that these perceptions can lead to hateful attitudes toward outgroups. The exact mechanism for this process is unclear, but public attitude expression may act as a means to expose and warn of the dangerous nature of the opposing social group (Brambillia and Leach, 2014; Goodwin, 2015; Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013).

Moral convictions and behavior. Aside from directly affecting attitudes within and between groups, possessing morally-relevant opinions or moral convictions (strong, absolute beliefs about right and wrong) may have the power to produce a wide variety of downstream effects and behaviors (Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka, Washburn, & Carsel, 2015). For example, one study found that when people possessed moral convictions regarding a topic, they were more likely to socially and physically distance themselves from opposing minded others (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). This social distancing may play a self-protection role, as those with opposing moral opinions may be perceived as potentially harmful, and therefore social avoidance is advantageous to wellbeing (Goodwin et al., 2014; Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014). Findings also suggested that moral opinions provoke attitudes and behavior so fervently because people experience moral convictions as facts, and therefore perceive them as more necessary to act upon than other subjective opinions (Skitka et al., 2015). This process, (experiencing moral convictions as fact), likely also influences the public expression of negative group attitudes: if one feels as if he or she possesses factual information that a group is immoral and therefore harmful, rather than just possessing an opinion, the individual may feel more justified in their public sharing of their negative attitude.

Also examining moral convictions, another study analyzed how the cognitive and affective components of an opinion influenced intolerance towards disagreeing others (Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). Regardless of how strongly people felt about an issue, participants only became intolerant of dissimilar others when the issue was morally relevant, or was a moral conviction for the participant. These studies exploring moral convictions display how adding moral weight to an issue increases opinion severity and immediately enhances disliking for disagreeing others (Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2008). As with social distancing, this sudden increase in intolerance may be due to the “harm signaling” nature of immorality (Gray et al., 2009; Piazza et al., 2014). Unlike other opinions, a dissenting moral opinion may suggest that there is something deeply wrong or threatening within the core of the dissenting party, and this perception of threat may motivate a need to distance oneself from the opposing other, or publicly expose the other to reveal their malicious intentions. These findings may elucidate why a vast amount of prejudice seems to occur between opposing religious or ideological groups rather than interest-based groups—opposing moral beliefs and values signal that the group is dangerous and must be avoided.

Delving deeper into real-life applications, possessing a moral conviction also leads people to decrease their trust in officials to make good decisions regarding the law. When participants possessed moral convictions about physician assisted suicide, they trusted Supreme Court officials’ ability to make the “right” decision less than those who did not possess a moral conviction (Wineski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009). Additionally, possessing moral convictions also led people to oppose political compromise (Ryan, 2013). As previously discussed, this opposition can play both a constructive and

destructive role. For example, speaking out, or refusing to compromise against an immorally perceived political system, can instigate desired societal change, or even be necessary for individual and group wellbeing. However, this opposition could potentially exacerbate political conflict, especially if disagreement deters progress, or increases unnecessary aggression between groups (Ryan, 2013; Wineski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009).

In a study examining the Israeli Jewish-Palestinian conflict, only individuals on the political far-right who also possessed moral convictions supported increased amounts of violence and negativity towards Palestinians, including an increased ambivalence for collateral damage, an increased desire for retribution, and a decrease in desire to compromise (Reifan, Tagar, Morgan, Halperin, and Skitka, 2013). The findings from this study somewhat parallel our hypothesis, but at a more severe level: Far-right Israeli's who perceived Palestinians as immoral supported very explicit negative outgroup behavior, in the form of mass violence. Mass violence, or explicit negative derogation, appeared justified due to the perceived immoral nature of the Palestinians.

Further supporting the power of immoral perceptions on the formation of explicit attitudes at an intergroup level, our recent work has found that perceptions of immorality lead to the endorsement of negative group attitudes and behaviors, above and beyond perceptions of competence or warmth (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a; Howard & Masicampo, 2016b). In one study, participants underwent a manipulation that either increased their perception of immorality, incompetence, or coldness towards a fictional social group, called Group A. Participants who perceived Group A as immoral reported significantly greater negative attitudes towards Group A than participants who perceived

Group A as incompetent or cold. This experimental study strongly supports the direct relationship between perceptions of morality and explicit negative attitudes, at least in an experimental setting (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a).

An additional study examined the relationship between immorality and explicit negative attitudes and behaviors using real life groups. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, in which they were asked to list a social group they perceived as 1) Immoral, but averagely competent and warm, 2) Cold, but averagely moral and competent, 3) Incompetent, but averagely moral and warm, or 4) Averagely moral, competent, or warm. Participants who listed an immoral but averagely competent and warm group endorsed explicit negative attitudes and behaviors towards their selected social group significantly more so than all other conditions. This study generalized our findings from the experimental study to include real life groups, and added strength to the argument that perceptions of morality play a mechanistic role in the endorsement of negative attitudes and behaviors towards social groups (Howard & Masicampo, 2016b).

Together, these studies support the central role of morality in impression formation, and strengthen the relationship between perceptions of immorality and the expression of explicit negative attitudes (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a; Howard & Masicampo, 2016b). If perceived immorality can lead to negative attitudes, then it is highly probable that increasing perceived morality may lead to more positive attitudes towards social groups. Therefore, if these immoral perceptions can be softened, and brought back to a more neutral level, the negative attitudes stemming from the initial immoral perceptions may, as a result, also be dampened. Therefore, this study is

attempting to replicate our previous results using a different method, and test the power and flexibility of the relationship between morality and expressed negative attitudes.

Function of Moral Perceptions in the Public Expression of Attitudes.

As has been shown by previous studies, perceived morality affects attitudes and behaviors within and between groups, and can lead to a variety of behavioral outcomes. Perceived morality typically leads to these outcomes more strongly than other traits and constructs, including perceived competence and warmth, and other social norm factors (Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016; Skitka et al., 2015). Morality impacts many psychological processes because it likely plays an informative role: moral perceptions determine who or what is safe and beneficial, and communicates who or what should be avoided to protect wellbeing (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Piazza et al., 2014). The experience of the immoral perception likely motivates people to publicly express negative attitudes towards certain groups. However, the exact mechanism, or motivation, linking immoral perceptions and public expression of negative group attitudes, and the ultimate function of this process, is not certain. As previously discussed, it may be that the perceived harmfulness of immoral groups produces a sense of urgency, and motivates people to expose the immoral person in order to protect wellbeing. Additionally, a process of dehumanization and empathy reduction associated with perceived immorality could motivate the public explicit attitude process. This potential process will be discussed in the following section.

Dehumanization. As argued in the current study, perceiving a target as immoral seemingly drives a person to publicly voice negative attitudes and behaviors towards the immorally perceived target (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Piazza et al., 2014; Skitka et

al., 2015). Although the expression of negative group directed attitudes and behaviors can be constructive, there are times when the public expression of negative attitudes can become hostile and destructive. The process of dehumanizing groups or targets may be a mechanism that motivates this public expression of negative attitudes (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014; Kteily, Breneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; Leyens, Demoulin, Vae, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013; Harris & Fiske, 2006). In regards to the current study, it may be that perceptions of immorality, or the perception that a target has acted in a brutal, inhumane way, decreases the perceived humanness of the target. This decreased humanness then affords the target lower moral consideration, and therefore allows, or justifies, the public derogation of the less-than-human target.

Dehumanization at the group or individual level occurs when a target is perceived as lacking either human uniqueness characteristics (i.e., intelligence, refinement) or human nature characteristics (i.e., warmth, compassion, empathy) (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014; Leidner et al., 2013). Groups lacking human uniqueness traits are typically compared to animals, whereas groups lacking human nature attributes are compared to robots (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, Leyens et al., 2007). Once a target is perceived as animalistic or robot-like, it may be psychologically easier for people to embrace and perpetuate negative attitudes, stereotypes, or negative behaviors towards these groups. Additionally, animals are typically assigned less moral responsibility and consideration than humans. Therefore, degrading an animal that is lacking in complete sentience and perceived to deserve less moral consideration, or insulting a robot that

cannot feel, likely induces less guilt than degrading a fully thinking and feeling human being (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Kteily et al., 2015).

Supporting this claim, a number of studies have found a link between moral status, harmfulness, and perceived humanness (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Pacilli et al., 2016). In a study attempting to discriminate the relationship between perceived agency and moral standing, it was found that individuals who were perceived as harmful, (typically after committing a crime or moral-violation), were also perceived as lacking in moral standing and humanness (Khamitov, Rotman, & Piazza, 2016). The harmful, immoral behavior of the targets led participants to view the target as lacking in basic human qualities (both human nature and uniqueness), such as empathy, self-control and compassion, and therefore the harmful target was perceived as less human. People then assigned less agency to the immoral target, because those who commit immoral acts were seen as less rational and logical, and therefore less agentic and able to act willingly on carefully considered intentions (Khamitov et al., 2016).

In regards to the potential functions and outcomes of dehumanization, findings suggest that dehumanization also occurs to those perceived as immoral as a means for moral disengagement: as people are seen as less human and more bestial, people feel more comfortable and justified administering cruel punishment on those they feel have committed immoral acts (Haslam and Laughnan, 2014; Leidner et al., 2013).

Empathizing with the immoral target becomes more of a challenge, as the immoral individual or group is perceived to be fundamentally different than the perceiver. In

extreme dehumanization, empathetic ties can be cut completely, allowing for severe negative punishment for the target (Goff et al., 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2006).

Supporting the link between dehumanization, morality, and punishment, one study found that individuals who possessed human uniqueness traits (logic, reason), but lacked in human nature traits (compassion, empathy), were attributed greater moral blame and harsher punishment than those possessing human nature traits (Basitan et al., 2011). Participants lacking human nature traits were also perceived to be less deserving of moral treatment, and less deserving of rehabilitation after committing a crime (Bastian et al., 2011).

This link between immorality, dehumanization, and punishment likely also occurs at the intergroup level, especially between opposing ideological groups. One study assessed the relationship between ingroup salience (strength of political group membership), perceived moral distance between groups, and dehumanization of the political outgroup (Pacilli et al., 2016). Results indicated that when participants identified more strongly with their political group, they perceived the opposing political group to be less moral than their own political group. This increase in moral distance then led participants to dehumanize and derogate the political outgroup to the greatest extent (Pacilli et al., 2016). Because political groups are often at competition and desire to suppress the competing parties, dehumanizing the political outgroup allows for harsh punishment in the form of public derogation, humiliation attempts, and antagonism (Pacilli et al., 2016). Examples of this dehumanization as a means to punish and derogate in politics are directly visible in the media: President George W Bush was routinely

characterized as a monkey, and the Obamas were characterized as “ape-like” in several foreign magazines (Kassam, 2014).

Just as with attitude formation, dehumanization can occur at the implicit, explicit, and public level, but due to social norms, a majority of dehumanization towards groups occurs at a non-explicit level (Kteily et al., 2015; Leyens et al., 2007). Although a significant portion of dehumanization likely occurs at a lower level of processing, several studies have found that explicit dehumanization does indeed occur, and is predictive of extreme, explicit negative group attitudes and prejudice (Bastian et al., 2011; Kteily et al., 2015; Leidner, et al., 2013). When participants rated black Americans as “less than human,” participants were more likely to also express explicit, negative, and even aggressive attitudes towards African Americans (Kteily et al., 2015). Additionally, another study found that when Jewish Israelis perceived Palestinian Israelis as robot-like and lacking in sentience, participants were less likely to support conflict resolution and more likely to support violent methods (Leidner et al., 2013).

In sum, it appears that people do not hesitate in their expression of extreme negative attitudes, prejudice, allocation of harsh punishment, and attribution of moral blame when a target is perceived to possess a sub-human animalistic or robotic status (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Kteily et al., Leidner et al., 2013; Pacilli et al., 2016).

Although the current study is only measuring perceived morality and negative attitudes, it may be that perceived immorality leads to either a process of moral disengagement and/or dehumanization, and this process cuts moral consideration and empathetic ties, and allows, or justifies, the explicit derogation captured in previous studies (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Howard & Masicampo, 2016). Additionally, this derogation may

also stem from a need or sense of urgency to expose the harmful, inhumane nature of immoral others in order to protect personal or societal wellbeing. Regardless of the exact mechanistic process, perceived immorality is potentially moving liberals to publicly express negative attitudes and behaviors towards conservatives, and conservatives to publicly express negative attitudes towards liberals.

Summary

In conclusion, perceptions of morality likely play a central role in the public sharing of explicit attitudes for a variety of reasons. First, morality appears to be a central trait in the person-perception process, frequently predicting outcomes and attitudes about individuals and groups above and beyond perceptions of warmth and competence (Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016; Leach et al., 2007). Unlike self-presentation or social desirability processes, perceived immorality likely motivates the expression of explicit attitudes despite conflicting majority opinions (Skitka et al., 2015; Wisneski et al., 2009). Furthermore, perceiving immorality or experiencing a moral conviction can lead people to publicly distance themselves, exclude, derogate, and distrust morally dissimilar others and social groups (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Skitka et al., 2015; Skitka et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2008). In regards to functionality, perceptions of morality likely play an informative role, signifying to perceivers which entities are safe and beneficial, and which are nefarious and potentially harmful (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2014). This perceived harmfulness and immorality likely lead to dehumanization and/or empathy-reducing processes, justifying the public derogation of social groups (Pacilli et al., 2011). Therefore, perceiving an

outgroup as immoral, above and beyond other perceptions and processes, may lead to the public expression of negative attitudes and behaviors directed towards social groups.

This potential mechanistic role played by morality in the public expression of negative group attitudes and behaviors will be assessed in the present work in two studies. Study 1 and Study 2 will attempt to replicate previous findings, in which perceived morality predicts negative attitudes more so than other perceptions, but Study 2 will also explore the relationship between perceived morality and implicit attitudes. Additionally, the present work will attempt to increase the perceived morality of a group in order to decrease negative attitudes towards that social group. The following section will briefly review the procedures and hypotheses in both studies.

The Present Work

In Study 1, participants will undergo a manipulation that increases either the perceived morality, warmth, or competence of their opposing political group (i.e., liberals or conservatives), and will then complete a measure of explicit negative attitudes and behaviors regarding their opposing political group. It is hypothesized that those manipulated into perceiving the opposing party as more moral rather than more warm or competent will express significantly less explicit negative attitudes and behaviors towards the opposing party.

In Study 2, participants will also receive a manipulation intended to increase perceptions of morality or warmth, but will also take a measure of implicit attitudes towards their opposing political group in order to assess whether perceptions of morality also affect implicit negative attitudes. Because perceived morality likely plays a role in the public expression of negative attitudes, it is believed that implicit attitudes should not

be impacted differentially by perceptions of warmth or morality, as implicit attitudes are not directly subject to public scrutiny and interpersonal forces.

Study 1 Hypotheses

At the start of the study, participants reported their political identification along with other demographic information. After receiving a manipulation intended to increase the perceived morality, warmth, or competence of liberals and conservatives, we tested whether people would willingly endorse negative attitudes and behaviors towards their opposing political party. We predicted that participants in the moral condition would report fewer negative attitudes and behaviors towards their opposing party than participants in the warmth, competence, or control condition. Additionally, we predicted that perceptions of morality would predict explicit negative attitude and behaviors more so than perceptions of warmth or competence, replicating the findings from our previous studies (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a; 2016b).

METHODS

Participants

Two-hundred and sixty-two online Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, approximately 65 in each condition, completed this study for financial compensation. The Mechanical Turk website was used as it is a fast, and convenient method of collecting quality data, and has been successfully used by a number of morality researchers (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2010; Piazza et al., 2014; Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016). The sample consisted of 123 (46.9%) females, 132 (50.4%) males, and two participants who identified as “other.” In regards to race, 198 (75.6%) participants identified as white, 23 (8.8%) as Asian, 22 (8.4%) as Black or African American, eight (3.1%) identified as “more than one race,” four (1.5%) who reported “Unknown or not reported,” and two (.8) identified as Native American or Alaskan native. Twenty (7.6%) participants identified as Hispanic or Latino, while the remaining 237 participants (90.5%) did not identify as Hispanic or Latino. Ages of participants ranged from 19 years to 71 years, with the mean age being 35.05 years, ($SD = 10.98$).

Procedure and Materials

This was a one-level (perception type), four condition (morality, warmth, competence, control) between subjects study design, in which each participant only received one of the conditions. All participants completed the survey online and first completed a brief demographic questionnaire in order to determine each participant’s political affiliation (i.e., whether conservative, or liberal). For the entirety of the survey, participants who identified as liberal answered questions about conservatives, and those

who identified as conservative answered questions about liberals. Participants also reported their gender, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and completed a brief measure assessing how important race, gender, religion and political affiliation were to their identity. Participants were then randomly assigned into one of four conditions: moral, competent, warmth, or control. For the moral, competent, and warmth conditions, participants underwent a manipulation that attempted to increase how moral, competent, or warm they perceived people from their opposing political party to be. Participants in the control condition did not complete the manipulation, but were directed straight to the manipulation check.

Manipulation. The manipulation was intended to increase how moral, competent, or warm liberals perceived conservatives to be, and to increase how moral, competent, or warm conservatives perceive liberals to be. First, participants were asked to think of a person of their opposing political party that they knew, or knew of, who fulfilled a list of requirements. In the moral condition, participants were asked to list a liberal/conservative they knew who was averagely competent and warm, but highly moral. In the competent condition, participants were asked to name a liberal/conservative they knew of who was averagely warm and moral, but highly competent. In the warmth condition, participants were asked to list a conservative/liberal they knew of who was averagely moral and competent, but highly warm. We clearly defined for participants what the terms moral, warm, and competent meant in terms of our study. Moral goodness was described as “fair, just, and trustworthy,” warmth was described as “sociable, agreeable, friendly, and gregarious,” and competence was described as “intelligent, skilled, able, and hardworking.”

Participants were made to distinguish between moral, warmth, and competence traits in order to isolate each of the trait-perceptions and their unique effects on the expression of negative group attitudes. Although the requirements for the ‘listed person’ may seem demanding or difficult for participants to meet, our previous studies found that participants were able to successfully identify a social group that met a list of similar, selective requirements (Howard & Masicampo, 2016b).

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the manipulation, on the following page participants were asked if they were able to think of a person who met the given requirements. Participants who responded “no” to this question were filtered out of the final analyses, as a negative response indicated that they did not successfully complete the manipulation. Only two participants responded that they could not think of a person that fulfilled the requirements, and this response did not vary as a function of condition.

Participants who were able to think of a target person who met the requirements of the manipulation were then asked to briefly explain why their chosen person was so moral, competent, or warm. For example, conservatives in the moral condition received the question: “*You said that (name of chosen person) was a highly moral person who also identifies as a liberal. Why is (name of chosen person) so moral?*” This section of the manipulation was intended to push the participant to re-examine their potentially strong beliefs regarding the opposing party by confronting them with their conflicting responses: they likely rated the opposing party negatively, yet were able to select an opposing party member they viewed as warm, competent, or moral. Writing an explanation for their conflicting responses ideally increased the processing time that participants spent thinking about how the opposing party was moral/warm/competent.

Additionally, this manipulation was intended to push participants to generalize their positive feelings about their selected individual to the rest of the individual's political party.

Manipulation Check. Participants completed the manipulation check immediately following the manipulation task. Regardless of condition, all participants rated how moral, competent, and warm they perceived either liberals or conservatives to be. These questions were presented in randomized order, and participants rated their perceptions for each trait on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being “not at all moral/competent/warm” and 7 being “completely moral/competent/warm.”

Negative explicit attitudes and behaviors directed toward social groups. After the manipulation check, all participants completed the negative explicit attitudes and group directed behavior measure. This measure consisted of 12 short scenarios describing hypothetical situations showcasing an explicitly negative attitude or negative behavior directed toward either liberals or conservatives. After reading each scenario, participants responded on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = do not at all agree; 7 = very much agree) how strongly they agreed with the negative attitude or behavior. The scenarios attempted to capture various elements of explicit negative attitudes and behaviors, including privately endorsed attitudes, public derogation, social exclusion, pressuring others to support negative group based beliefs, and endorsement of institutionalized negative group directed behavior. See Appendix A for the complete negative explicit group directed attitudes and behavior measure.

Responses from the 12 questions were averaged, and used to create a total composite score of explicit negative attitudes and behaviors, $\alpha = .91$. Studies assessing

person-perception and prejudice often successfully make use of Likert-type scales, and therefore use of this format is appropriate for our study (Brambilla et al., 2012; Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2015).

Once the explicit negative attitudes and behaviors measure was complete, participants were compensated for their participation, and were presented with a short debriefing statement describing the research questions and goals of the study.

RESULTS

Manipulation check

We computed mean ratings for perceptions of morality, competence, and warmth for each condition to test the effectiveness of the manipulation. See Table 1 for exact means and standard deviations for perception ratings, and see Table 2 for correlations between key variables. We compared means for each perception trait within condition and across condition in order to check if the proper patterns emerged. Across conditions, mean perception scores suggest that overall, the manipulation did not successfully increase the proper perceptions. However, the means for the competence condition follow the hypothesized pattern, in which mean ratings of perceived competence are higher in the competence condition than in the moral, warmth, and control conditions, suggesting that perceptions of competence may have been successfully manipulated. Overall, within-condition mean perception ratings did not follow the hypothesized pattern. Again, only the competence condition seemed to follow the hypothesized pattern, as mean ratings of perceived competence were significantly higher than perceptions of morality or warmth. Overall, results strongly suggest that the manipulation was ineffective in manipulating how conservatives perceive liberals, and how liberals perceive conservatives.

Table 1
Study 1 Perception Ratings

Perception Ratings	Condition			
	Moral	Warm	Competent	Control
Moral	4.25(1.25) ^{1a}	3.95(1.07) ^{1a}	4.25(1.52) ^{1a}	3.88(1.50) ^{1a}
Warm	4.25(1.35) ^{1a}	3.79(1.34) ^{12a}	4.15(1.54) ^{1a}	3.55(1.61) ^{2b}
Competent	4.61(1.23) ^{1b}	4.31(1.27) ^{12b}	4.69(1.33) ^{1b}	4.03(1.66) ^{2a}

Note. Mean perception ratings per condition are displayed with standard deviations in parentheses. Values within a column are significantly different ($p < .05$) if they do not share an alphabetical superscript. Values within a row are significantly different ($p < .05$) if they do not share a numerical superscript.

Table 2
Study 1 Correlations Between Key Variables

Measure	1	2	3	4
Moral Rating				
Warm Rating	.74**			
Competent Rating	.63**	.59**		
Explicit Negative Attitudes	-.30**	-.16*	-.29**	
Political Affiliation	.07	.11	.03	-.05

Note. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Political affiliation is on 0 -1 scale, in which 0 = Liberal and 1 = Conservative

Effect of Perception Type on Negative Explicit Attitudes and Behaviors Directed Toward Social Groups

We conducted a one-way ANOVA to assess whether condition (moral, warmth, competent, or control) would lead to group mean differences in negative group directed attitude and behavior scores. In order to test the hypothesis that those in the moral condition would express significantly lower negative attitudes than participants in the competent, warmth, and control conditions, planned comparisons between the moral condition and each of the remaining three conditions were conducted. Contrary to the hypothesis, no significant differences were found between conditions, $F(3, 250) = .691, p = .558$. Those in the moral condition ($M = 1.93, SD = 1.14$) did not report significantly lower negative explicit attitudes than those in the warmth ($M = 2.03, SD = 1.01$), $t(250) = -.48, p = .631$, competence ($M = 2.22, SD = 1.26$), $t(250) = -1.42, p = .158$, or control conditions ($M = 2.03, SD = 1.19$), $t(250) = -.53, p = .600$. However, despite the lack of significant differences between mean explicit negative attitude scores, mean explicit negative attitudes trended in the hypothesized pattern, with the moral condition displaying lower negative explicit attitudes than the warmth, competent, and control condition.

Regression Analysis

A regression analysis testing whether perceptions of morality predicted explicit negative group directed attitudes and behaviors to a greater extent than perceptions of warmth or competence was conducted. As predicted, the overall model fit was significant, in which all three perceptions together significantly explained 12.2% of the variance in explicit negative attitudes $F(3, 250) = 11.545, p < .001$. Supporting the

hypothesis, when controlling for perceptions of warmth ($\beta = .19, p = .033$) and competence ($\beta = -.21, p = .010$), perceived morality was the best predictor of negative explicit attitudes ($\beta = -.312, p = .001$).

Discussion

Overall, the hypotheses were only partially supported. The first hypothesis, that participants in the moral condition would express significantly lower explicit negative attitudes than participants in the warmth, competence, and control condition, was not supported. The lack of significant findings on the explicit measure is likely due to the lack of effectiveness of the manipulation. Still, results trended in the appropriate pattern, as negative attitude scores were lowest in the moral condition. However, the second hypothesis, that perceptions of morality would significantly predict explicit negative attitudes and behaviors more so than competence and warmth, was supported, replicating findings from our previous work (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a, 2016b). Due to the ineffectiveness of the Study 1 manipulation, Study 2 will make use of a different manipulation that may be more effective in inducing perceptions of morality and warmth.

STUDY 2

Study 2 was similar to Study 1 in design, but rather than using only an explicit measure of negative attitudes and behaviors, Study 2 incorporated an implicit measure. Study 2 participants also received a manipulation intended to increase the perceived morality or warmth of liberals and conservatives; however this manipulation took a different form. Additionally, the competence manipulation was not included, as it did not provide any novel findings to previous studies. After receiving the manipulation, we

tested whether people would willingly endorse negative attitudes and behaviors towards their opposing political party. We also tested whether participants possessed negative implicit attitudes towards both liberals and conservatives.

The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) was used to measure implicit attitudes for this study as it has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of implicit attitudes for a variety of constructs and social groups, including attitudes towards groups, prejudice, (Cooley, Payne, & Phillips 2014), political behavior (Carraro, Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010; Lundberg, 2015), and moral decision making (Hofmann & Baumert, 2010). Additionally, a meta-analysis on studies using the AMP found that the AMP predicted behavior at an average effect size of $r = .35$. This effect size is similar to other measures of implicit attitudes, such as the IAT (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012).

An implicit measure was used in Study 2 primarily to test whether perceived morality plays a specialized role in the psychological process that motivates people to make negative group directed attitudes explicit and publicly known. If morality plays a specialized role in this publicization process, then it should not affect implicit attitudes more so than perceptions of warmth. This difference in how perceptions affect public verses implicit negative attitudes may arise because implicit attitudes are composed of numerous perceptions (including morality and warmth), that are not directly subject to self-presentation, social scrutiny, and pressures of social desirability. The public expression of negative group-directed attitudes may rely on perceived morality more so than perceptions of warmth, because perceiving a group as immoral likely leads people to feel more comfortable, or justified, publicly voicing their negative attitudes.

Additionally, all of the previous work that we are aware of on perceptions of morality and the endorsement of negative attitudes and behaviors has only investigated attitudes at the explicit level (Brambilla et al., 2013; Howard & Masicampo, 2016a, 2016b). Assessing implicit negative attitudes may also allow us to detect findings that were initially clouded by socially desirable responding, or other explicit processes, distorting the full relationship between perceived morality and prejudice.

Hypotheses

First, it was predicted that increased perceptions of morality toward opposing political groups would lead to a greater reduction in the public expression of negative group-directed attitudes than perceptions of warmth, or for participants in the control condition. Secondly, it was predicted that this larger effect of moral perceptions over other trait perceptions would be significantly stronger for explicit attitudes than for implicit attitudes. Restated, perceptions of morality should not decrease negative implicit attitudes significantly more so than perceptions of warmth. Lastly, it was hypothesized that perceptions of morality should predict the expression of both explicit and implicit negative attitudes towards opposing political groups. However, perceptions of morality should uniquely predict the expression of explicit negative attitudes more so than implicit negative attitudes. Morality should not predict implicit attitudes more so than perceptions of warmth or competence.

METHODS

Participants

One-hundred and sixty-three undergraduates from a small liberal arts university, with 65 participants in the moral condition, 66 in the warmth condition, and 33 in the control condition, completed this study for a psychology class credit. The sample consisted of 69 (42.1%) females, 93 (56.7%) males, and one participant who identified as “other”. In regards to race, 125 (76.2%) participants identified as white, 17 (10.4%) as Asian, 13 (7.9%) as Black or African American, four (2.4%) identified as “more than one race,” two (1.2%) as Middle Eastern/Arab, and two (1.2%) as unknown or not reported. Nine (5.5%) participants identified as Hispanic or Latino, while the remaining 153 participants (93.3%) did not identify as Hispanic or Latino. Ages of participants ranged from 18 years to 22 years, with the mean age being 19.14 years, ($SD = 1.10$).

Procedure and Materials

This was a one-level (perception type), three condition (moral, warmth, control) between subjects design, in which each participant only received one of the conditions. Both the survey and AMP were completed on a computer in a single-person lab space. Participants were first presented with a brief demographic questionnaire identical to the one in Study 1 in order to determine political affiliation (i.e., whether conservative, or liberal). For the entirety of the survey, participants who identified as liberal answered questions about conservatives, and those who identified as conservative answered questions about liberals. Participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions: moral, warmth, or control. For the moral and warmth conditions, participants received a manipulation intended to increase how moral or warm they perceived people

from their opposing political party to be. Participants in the control condition did not complete the manipulation, but were directed straight to the manipulation check questionnaire.

Manipulation. As in Study 1, the Study 2 manipulation was intended to increase how moral or warm liberals perceived conservatives to be, and to increase how moral or warm conservatives perceived liberals to be. First, participants were informed that “*the experimenters had gathered a set of studies recently published in scientific journals,*” and that each of the studies showed that “*both liberals and conservatives were more morally good (or warm) than other people (e.g., more than those who do not identify with an ideology), with liberals (or conservatives) being slightly more morally good (or warm) than conservatives (or liberals).*” Participants were told they were going to read four short summaries, and after reading had to answer questions regarding the summaries.

Unbeknownst to the participant, the article summaries and corresponding citations were all fictional. Each study made use of a different design, and communicated that people from both parties were found to be more warm/moral than non-political people, with the participant’s opposing political party being slightly more moral/warm. See Appendix B for all four of the fictional summaries.

After reading the summaries, participants answered six questions testing their comprehension of the information presented in the studies. The correct answer was displayed after the participant responded. These questions were intended to increase the amount of attention participants exerted while reading the summaries, and to increase the likelihood that the participants understood the study results. The first four questions were in randomized order and simply required participants to recall information. One of the

questions was fill-in-the-blank, and the remaining three were multiple choice. The last two questions required participants to order the studies from least to most convincing, and then provide a brief description as to why their selected study convinced them most strongly that “liberals/conservatives are warm/moral.” By ordering the studies, participants were forced to label one of the articles as convincing, ideally enhancing the manipulation. See Appendix C for the entire list of Study 2 manipulation questions.

Manipulation Check. The Study 2 manipulation check was identical to the Study 1 manipulation check, in which participants completed the measure immediately following the manipulation task. Regardless of condition, all participants rated how moral, competent, and warm they perceived either liberals or conservatives to be. These questions were presented in randomized order, and participants rated their perceptions for each trait on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being “not at all moral/competent/warm” and 7 being “completely moral/competent/warm.”

Negative explicit attitudes and behaviors directed toward social groups. After the manipulation check, half of participants were randomly assigned to complete the explicit negative attitudes measure before the AMP. This measure was identical to the explicit negative group directed attitudes and behaviors in Study 1. As in Study 1, this measure consisted of 12 short scenarios describing hypothetical situations showcasing an explicitly negative attitude or negative behavior directed toward either liberals or conservatives. After reading each scenario, participants responded on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = do not at all agree; 7 = very much agree) how strongly they agreed with the negative attitude or behavior. Responses from the 12 questions were averaged, and used to create a total composite score of explicit negative attitudes and behaviors.

See Appendix A for the complete negative explicit group directed attitudes and behavior measure.

Implicit negative attitudes. After the manipulation check, all participants completed the Affective Misattribution Procedure, or AMP, as a measure of implicit negative attitudes directed towards liberals or conservatives. As in previous studies using the AMP, a series of visual primes were briefly presented to participants on a screen, each followed by an ambiguous image, and then a blank screen (Cooley et al., 2014; Payne et al., 2010). Participants were informed to rate the ambiguous image either as pleasant or unpleasant, and were also told to not allow the primed image to influence their rating of the ambiguous image. If participants possessed implicit attitudes, ratings of ambiguous images should change in response to the image being primed, despite instruction to participants to not allow the primed image to affect their interpretation of the ambiguous image (Payne & Lundberg, 2014).

For the current study, we presented a total of 80 trials, in which the prime stimulus was presented for 75 ms, followed by exposure to an ambiguous target-image for 125 ms, which consisted of a variety of already known to be ambiguous Chinese pictographs (Payne et al., 2010). After viewing the Chinese pictograph, a visual mask containing a random black and white dot pattern covered the target. When viewing the mask, participants rated whether they found the pictograph to be more or less pleasant than the average Chinese pictograph (Payne et al., 2010). Half of the prime images included the experimental politically relevant images, while the other half included neutral words and faces. For the experimental images, primed words included: *democrat*, *republican*, *conservative*, *liberal*, and primed faces included: George Bush, Donald

Trump, Hilary Clinton, and Barack Obama. Neutral primed words included: *chair, table, shovel, basket*, while the neutral primed faces were found on the internet, and consistent of faces with similar demographic features as the experimental face images. All face images were smiling and cropped in the same shape. Forty word primes were presented and 40 face primes were presented. Implicit prejudice scores were obtained by subtracting the proportion of unpleasant target ratings following neutral stimuli from the proportion of unpleasant target ratings following stimuli from the opposing political party. A more detailed account of how implicit scores were calculated will be discussed in the Results.

RESULTS

Note on Analyses

Due to a programming error on the online survey, an insufficiently small number of valid participant responses were obtained for several measures in the control condition. Due to this error, the control condition will not be included in the manipulation check results, the ANOVA assessing whether perception type led to a decrease in explicit negative attitudes, and the regression analysis assessing which perceptions most strongly predicted negative explicit attitudes. However, a sufficient number of participant responses were collected for the implicit measure of negative group attitudes, and therefore the control condition will be included in the ANOVA assessing whether perception-type led to a decrease in implicit negative attitude, and the regression analysis assessing which perceptions most strongly predicted negative implicit attitudes.

Manipulation Check

Mean perception scores suggest that overall, the manipulation only partially increased the proper perceptions for all conditions. Because the control condition could not be included in this analysis, moral and warmth scores could not be compared to a baseline measure. Therefore, no strong conclusions can be drawn as to whether the manipulation was able to increase or decrease scores from baseline. However, between and within conditions, moral and warmth scores at least trended in the hypothesized pattern. See Table 3 for exact mean values between and within conditions, and see Table 4 for correlations between key variables.

Table 3
Study 2 Perception Ratings

Perception Ratings	Condition	
	Moral	Warm
Moral	4.83(1.22) ^{1a}	4.39(1.28) ^{2a}
Warm	4.34(1.35) ^{1b}	4.77(1.25) ^{1b}
Competent	4.52(1.28) ^{1b}	4.38(1.49) ^{1a}

Note. Mean perception ratings per condition are displayed with standard deviations in parentheses. Values within a column are significantly different ($p < .05$) if they do not share an alphabetical superscript. Values within a row are significantly different ($p < .05$) if they do not share a numerical superscript.

Table 4
Study 2 Correlations Between Key Variables

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6
Negative Explicit Attitudes						
Negative Implicit Attitudes	.21*					
Moral Rating	-.35**	-.20*				
Warm Rating	-.20*	-.20*	.56**			
Competence Rating	-.30**	-.18*	.65**	.54**		
Political Affiliation	.01	-.09	.01	-.05	.003	
Importance of Political Identity	.18*	-.18*	-.28**	-.23**	-.47**	-.17*

Note. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Political affiliation is on 0 -1 scale, in which 0 = Liberal and 1 = Conservative

Effect of Perception Type on Negative Explicit Attitudes and Behaviors Directed Toward Social Groups

Due to a programming error, the control condition was not included in this analysis. Total explicit attitude scores were calculated by taking the average of the 12 item responses on the measure, with higher total scores indicating a greater willingness to endorse explicit negative attitudes and behaviors towards the opposing political party ($\alpha = .90$). Each item was on a seven point scale, (1 = do not at all agree, 7 = completely agree), and total negative explicit attitude scores ranged from 1.00 to 4.33, with an average negative attitude score of 1.82 ($SD = .88$). We conducted an independent samples t-test to assess whether participants in the moral condition reported significantly lower negative explicit attitudes and behaviors than participants in the warm condition. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant differences between groups: explicit negative attitudes and behaviors were not significantly lower in the moral condition ($M = 1.85$, $SD = .91$) than in the warm condition ($M = 1.80$, $SD = .87$), $t(128) = .31$, $p = .755$.

Effect of Perception Type on Negative Implicit Attitudes

The programming error did not affect the AMP, therefore the control condition was included in this analysis. In the AMP procedure, participants rated 80 neutral target images (Chinese pictographs) as either pleasant or unpleasant. Images of neutral stimuli and political stimuli were flashed before the presentation of each target image, and these stimuli were intended to implicitly prime the participant to rate the target image as either pleasant or unpleasant. For example, if implicit group biases were present, liberal participants should have rated targets primed with conservative stimuli as unpleasant more frequently than targets preceded by neutral stimuli.

Negative implicit attitude scores were created by calculating two proportions: the proportion of unpleasant target ratings to total possible target ratings when targets followed the opposing party stimuli and the same proportion again when targets followed neutral stimuli. The proportion of unpleasant target ratings when followed by neutral stimuli was subtracted from the proportion of unpleasant target ratings when followed by opposing political party stimuli, creating the total implicit attitude score. Negative implicit attitudes ranged from -.30 to .93, ($M = .16$, $SD = .25$), with higher scores indicating greater negative implicit attitudes towards the opposing political party.

We conducted a one-way ANOVA to assess whether condition (moral, warmth, or control) would lead to group mean differences in negative implicit attitudes. We hypothesized that implicit negative attitudes would be significantly lower in the moral and warmth conditions than in the control condition, but that there would be no significant difference in implicit scores between the moral and warmth conditions. In order to test this hypothesis, that moral and warmth perceptions would be equally affective, planned comparisons between the moral condition and the remaining two conditions were also conducted.

Contrary to the hypothesis, there were no significant differences between any of the conditions $F(2, 147) = 1.38$, $p = .254$. Neither morality, ($M = .12$, $SD = .23$), $t(147) = -1.38$, $p = .169$, nor warmth ($M = .18$, $SD = .28$), $t(147) = -.19$, $p = .850$, led to a decrease in negative implicit attitude scores when compared to the control condition ($M = .20$, $SD = .23$). Although it was originally hypothesized that morality would not decrease implicit attitudes more so than warmth, and our results actually support this prediction $t(147) = -1.43$, $p = .154$., this lack of significant differences is likely due to the fact that any

potential perceptions induced by the manipulation did not affect implicit negative attitudes at all.

Regression Analysis: Negative Explicit Attitudes and Behaviors Directed Toward Social Groups

Due to a programming error, the control condition was not included in this analysis. Perceptions of morality, warmth, and competence were entered into a multiple linear regression in order to predict explicit negative group directed attitudes and behaviors. Again, the control condition was not included in this analysis. Fully supporting the hypothesis, the overall model significantly predicted negative group directed attitudes and behaviors towards the opposing political party $F(3, 126) = 6.18, p = .001$, with the model explaining 12.8% of the variance in explicit negative attitude scores. Additionally, it was found that perceptions of morality significantly predicted negative explicit attitudes ($\beta = -.26, SE = .082, p = .030$), while perceptions of warmth ($\beta = -.01, SE = .067, p = .948$) and competence ($\beta = -.13, SE = .072, p = .267$) did not. In fact, only perceptions of morality uniquely and significantly predicted explicit negative attitudes towards the opposing political party, supporting the secondary hypothesis.

Regression Analysis: Perception Type on Implicit Negative Attitudes

Because the programming error did not affect the AMP, the control condition was included in this analysis. Perceptions of morality, warmth, and competence were entered into a multiple linear regression in order to predict implicit negative group directed attitude scores between conservatives and liberals. Because all participants rated both liberals and conservatives for this implicit attitude measure (AMP), the control condition

was included in this analysis. Supporting the hypothesis, the overall model significantly predicted negative implicit attitudes $F(3, 146) = 2.74, p = .046$. Although a small effect, ($f^2 = .06$), the model significantly explained 5.3% of the variance in negative implicit attitudes. Also supporting the hypothesis, it was found that perceptions of morality ($\beta = -.11, SE = .022, p = .331$) did not significantly predict negative implicit attitudes more so than perceptions of warmth ($\beta = -.11, SE = .019, p = .268$) or competence ($\beta = -.05, SE = .020, p = .655$). In fact, no perception uniquely, significantly, predicted implicit negative attitudes.

Discussion

Although the manipulation may have been marginally effective in creating a difference in warmth and moral perceptions, the absence of a control condition made it impossible to determine whether these changes were altered from baseline perceptions. Therefore, no valid conclusions can be drawn from the manipulation check. Contrary to the first hypothesis, participants in the moral condition did not report significantly lower explicit negative group directed attitudes than participants in the warmth condition. Additionally, our hypothesis that perceptions of morality and warmth would be equally effective at reducing implicit attitudes, with neither perception playing a significantly larger role than the other, was also not supported: Neither perceptions of morality or warmth significantly reduced implicit attitudes compared to the control condition. Supporting our secondary hypothesis, perceptions of morality, competence, and warmth significantly predicted explicit attitudes, but when controlling for the other perceptions, morality was the only significant, unique, predictor of explicit negative attitudes. As predicted, morality was the best predictor for explicit attitudes, but not implicit attitudes.

Although all three perceptions significantly predicted implicit attitudes, morality did not uniquely and significantly predict implicit attitudes above and beyond perceptions of warmth and competence. In sum, negative attitudes were not reduced, but morality's unique role in the public expression of negative group directed attitudes was supported.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Overall, it appears that perceptions of morality play a role in the public expression of negative, group directed attitudes. Although our manipulations were not able to successfully increase moral perceptions and decrease negative attitudes towards opposing political parties, the regression analyses suggest that morality plays a unique role in the public expression of negative group directed attitudes. When groups were rated as less moral, as opposed to less warm or competent, people were more likely to express explicit negative attitudes towards their opposing political party. However, all three trait perceptions predicted implicit negative attitudes, with none offering any, unique explanatory power. This is the first study to display morality's unique role in the public sharing of explicit negative attitudes, but not in negative implicit attitudes.

Study 1 only partially supported our hypotheses. Contrary to the primary hypothesis, participants who underwent the moral manipulation did not report significantly less negative explicit attitudes and behaviors than participants in the control condition, or participants who received the warm and competent manipulations. It may be that the hypothesized relationship was not detected due to the ineffectiveness of the manipulation: after analysis of the manipulation check, moral ratings of the target group were not overall higher in the moral condition. This pattern was found across the warmth and competence condition as well. Due to the ineffectiveness of the manipulation, we still cannot make any firm claims as to whether perceptions of increased morality impacted negative explicit attitudes for Study 1. Because we have previously found that immoral perceptions lead to increased negative explicit attitudes, it would logically follow that decreasing these immoral perceptions would decrease negative attitudes.

Therefore, a relationship may still potentially exist between increased perceived morality and decreased negative explicit attitudes and behaviors.

Despite the lack of significant findings for the first Study 1 hypothesis, the secondary hypothesis was supported: perceptions of morality significantly predicted explicit negative attitudes and behaviors over and above perceptions of competence and warmth. Still, it is important to note that competence and warmth also significantly predicted negative explicit attitudes, but to a lesser extent. However, these significant findings for competence and warmth may be more unique to Study 1, as in Study 2 neither perception was significant, and both perceptions are typically insignificant in our previous work. Overall, these findings replicate our previous work and findings from the literature that suggest perceived morality is a central trait in impression and attitude formation (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016; Howard & Masicampo, 2016a, 2016b).

However, because we were not able to establish causality with the manipulation and attitude measure, the direction of the relationship between perceived morality and negative attitudes cannot be established. It could be that people first experience negative attitudes about opposing political members, and this negative attitude leads to immoral perceptions. Although we have established causality in a previous study manipulating perceptions of immorality and assessing explicit negative attitudes, claiming that immoral perceptions lead to negative attitudes in the current study is invalid, as we were not able to manipulate perceived morality and document how attitudes change (Howard & Masicampo, 2016a). Because our supported findings were only composed of regression analyses and correlational data, the uncertain direction of the relationship between

morality and negative attitudes needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the remainder of our findings.

Study 2 investigated the same relationship between perceived morality and explicit negative attitudes as in Study 1, but added an implicit measure of negative group directed attitudes. The implicit measure was added to test whether the perception of morality plays a unique role in the public expression of negative group directed attitudes, not merely the formation of negative attitudes. Additionally, the manipulation to increase perceptions of morality and warmth in Study 2 was altered. This alteration was intended to strengthen the manipulation, and to potentially replicate Study 1 findings using a different method.

As in Study 1, the primary hypothesis in Study 2 was not supported: participants in the moral condition did not express significantly lower explicit negative attitudes and behaviors than participants in the warmth condition. This lack of significant findings was also found for the implicit measure. Although the manipulation appeared to appropriately increase perceptions of morality over warmth, this increase was small, and was potentially not significantly different from baseline, due to the absence of the comparison to the control condition.

However, as in Study 1, the secondary hypothesis for Study 2 was supported. Perceptions of morality uniquely predicted explicit negative attitudes, while perceptions of competence and warmth did not. Also as predicted, this pattern only emerged for explicit attitudes and not implicit attitudes. All three perceptions predicted negative implicit attitudes, but none of them, including morality, uniquely contributed any

explanatory power. These findings support the argument that morality plays a unique, potentially mechanistic role in motivating people to publicly express negative group directed attitudes.

In sum, perceptions of morality were able to significantly predict explicit and implicit attitudes, but were not able to decrease negative attitudes towards opposing political parties. Potential explanations for this inability to decrease negative attitudes will be discussed below.

Potential Explanations for the Manipulation

For both Study 1 and Study 2, participants who underwent the moral manipulation did not report significantly lower negative explicit attitudes than participants in the other conditions. Although the effectiveness of the manipulation in Study 2 is difficult to gauge, the lack of significant findings in explicit attitude scores may be due to ineffective manipulations for both studies. To briefly summarize, participants in Study 1 listed an individual of the opposing party they found to be highly moral (or warm/competent) and average on the other traits, and then explained why this person was so moral (or warm/competent) despite their opposing political affiliation. For Study 2, participants read fictional studies portraying their opposing party as moral (or warm), and then answered a series of questions about the studies.

For both studies, there are likely several reasons as to why the manipulation did not adequately increase moral, warmth, and (and for study 1, competence), perceptions. First of all, it is likely that a number of participants in both studies possessed moral convictions in regards to politics, or certain political party members. As several studies

have shown, moral convictions are frequently experienced as facts, produce strong, emotional reactions within the individual, and lead people to socially avoid, and refuse to cooperate, with dissenting others (Ryan, 2013; Skitka et al., 2015; Skitka et al., 2009; Wright et al., 2008). If participants perceived their party as factually correct and morally superior on all platforms, than merely asking participants to explain why their opposing party is moral is likely not a strong enough manipulation. Rather than thoughtfully providing an explanation for the opposing party's morality, participants may have simply answered the question in order to move on with the survey, while still maintaining the belief that the opposing party is immoral and inferior.

For Study 2, if participants possessed strong moral convictions and believed the opposing party to be immoral on a factual basis, than participants may have disregarded the findings in the fictional studies in the manipulation to be flawed, or even fictional. For both studies, it is even possible that participants believed and fully engaged with the manipulation, but the presence of moral convictions just made the negative group directed attitudes too strong to be overcome by a five to ten minute manipulation.

For study 1, It is also very possible that people did not, or avoided, generalizing their moral perceptions from the individual they selected (moral/warm/competent and belonging to the opposing party) to the entire opposing political party. Rather than viewing their selected individual as representative of the opposing party, it is possible participants viewed their selected individual as a moral (or warm/competent) exception to the rule. This logic could also apply to Study 2, in which participants viewed the selected studies as mere exceptions to the rule.

Aside from inadequate manipulations, the relationship between perceived morality and negative attitudes may possess a negativity bias (Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993). It could be that increased morality leads to the expression of negative attitudes, but that this relationship does not work in the positive direction: enhanced morality may does not alleviate negative attitudes. This negativity bias could exist for a variety of reasons, one being that immoral perception may be stronger, more threatening, and more relevant to wellbeing than moral perceptions, and therefore may alter attitudes more immediately.

Furthermore, aligning with the morality and harm literature, a moral perception may signify that “all is well,” and that attitudes and behaviors do not have to change, whereas an immoral perception may signify harm, and therefore initiate action and attitude change (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Piazza et al., 2014). However, this explanation contradicts findings within the person perception literature, in which moral perceptions increase respect and liking for individuals (Goodwin et al., 2014; Hartley et al., 2016). This latter logic would support our predictions from the current study, and suggest that increasing morality would in turn increase liking, and therefore decrease negative attitudes. Future studies should attempt to address this potential contradiction, and determine whether a negativity bias exists in regards to morality and the formation of negative explicit attitudes.

Despite the ineffectiveness of the manipulations, and potential negativity bias in regards to the relationship between moral perceptions and negative group attitudes, Study 1 and Study 2 strongly support the argument that moral perceptions play a prominent, role in the public expression of negative group directed attitudes and behaviors.

Perceiving an individual or group as immoral likely initiates various psychological processes that then motivate people to feel comfortable, justified, or even obligated to publicly derogate or critique certain social groups.

Limitations

One limitation of the current work concerns the lack of explored moderating variables. Assessing whether participants possessed a moral conviction in regards to politics, or simply whether participants possessed moral convictions on any matter, may have provided additional insight on the relationship between perceived morality and explicit attitudes. For example, it could be that participants more likely to possess convictions are more likely to use morality as a basis for their judgments, strengthening the hypothesized relationship. Or, assessing moral convictions could have offered further insight regarding the ineffectiveness of the manipulation: participants who possessed political convictions may not have been affected by the manipulation, while participants who possessed less moralized attitudes may have experienced a change in attitude.

Furthermore, analysis of other individual personality differences could have offered more nuanced explanations for Study 1 and Study 2 findings. Because this study assessed the process of explicit attitude formation, it may have been beneficial to assess personality traits that are known to impact the degree with which people express their consciously held negative attitudes. For example, participants high in self-monitoring, (altering appearance, attitude, and opinions in order to achieve a desired social image), may have altered their explicit negative attitudes if they perceived the researchers to possess attitudes that conflicted with their own. If self-monitoring truly did impact

participant responding, then explicit attitude scores could be artificially low or high. Despite these potentially overlooked relationships, our findings still support our hypothesis that perceptions of morality play a unique role in the public expression of negative attitudes. Therefore, assessing moderating variables may not have been necessary for this study, but would likely yield fruitful findings for future studies.

Furthermore, Study 1 relied only on data from Mechanical Turk. Because the survey could be taken online and therefore anywhere, there is no way to know if participants were distracted when completing the study. Requiring participants to complete the survey in a controlled, experimental environment may have yielded more consistent, reliable results. Despite these potential shortcomings, numerous studies have shown that Mechanical Turk data are quality and often as reliable as in-lab methods of data collection (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2010; Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016).

Future directions

Due to ineffective manipulations, the current study was not able to detect the relationship between increased perceptions of morality and decreased negative attitudes. Future studies should experiment with different forms of morality manipulations in order to increase perceived morality between social groups. Because moral convictions may be playing a powerful role, a stronger manipulation, potentially lasting longer than five minutes, might be necessary to achieve the desired effect.

For example, one such method could use concepts from contact theory. Rather than merely reading prompts and answering questions, participants could interact with an

individual of the opposing political party in a lab setting. Participants could potentially work together and cooperate with an individual from the opposing party in order to achieve a goal, or complete a reflective group task. Ideally, participants would realize they share similarities with the opposing party other, with both party members hopefully agreeing on various overarching values and beliefs.

Although different forms of the manipulation should be investigated, it would also be advantageous to test whether a negativity bias does indeed exist, in which perceptions of immorality increase negative attitudes, but perceptions of morality do not decrease negative attitudes. A study could manipulate moral and immoral perceptions of a neutral group in order to assess whether both perceptions can move attitudes in the appropriate direction. If moral and immoral perceptions influence attitudes in the hypothesized directions, than a stricter test could be employed, in which groups already perceived as moral or immoral are manipulated to appear more immoral and more moral. If these findings come out as hypothesized, than the lack of negativity bias would be strongly supported, and manipulations attempting to increase perceived morality should be explored.

As discussed in the paper, the possible mechanisms linking perceived immorality and the public expression of negative group directed attitudes were not directly assessed in the studies, and therefore should be assessed in future work. Specifically, examining how empathy and dehumanization mediate the relationship between perceived immorality and explicit negative group attitudes could potentially yield fruitful results, as dehumanization has already been found to be associated with perceived morality, empathy, and negative attitudes (Bastian et al., 2011, Kteily et al., 2015; Leyens et al.,

2007). Additionally, investigating how closely perceived harmfulness is associated with perceived immorality, and deciphering whether one perception occurs before the other, would also provide insight into the mechanisms driving the relationship. It may be that empathy, dehumanization, perceived harmfulness, and the public expression of negative group attitudes are linked: perceiving a target as immoral leads people to perceive the target as less than human, and this dehumanization process decreases empathy, potentially justifying the public derogation of the target. Future studies would need to carefully test these potential mediating pathways.

Another potential next step would be to increase the extremity, and ecological validity of the public negative attitudes measure. Rather than reporting negative explicit attitudes on a survey, participants could rate their perceived morality of certain social groups, and then be presented with a task in a lab situation in which they are asked to share their attitudes and opinions about the social groups in front of other people. This method would more closely capture the sort of public expression of negative group attitudes that occurs in real life, and more vigorously test the relationship between perceived morality and explicit attitude expression.

Conclusion

Although our hypotheses were only partially supported, results suggest that perceptions of morality, potentially more so than perceptions of warmth or competence, play a prominent role in the public expression of negative group directed attitudes and behaviors. Overall, it appears that when people perceive a social group as immoral, they are immune to the various social pressures that would otherwise motivate them to keep

their explicit attitudes private. Along with competence and warmth, moral perceptions contribute to negative implicit attitudes, but morality plays a unique role in potentially motivating people to feel comfortable, justified, or even obligated to publicly announce their negative attitudes. Processes of dehumanization, perceived harmfulness, and a loss of empathetic connection may follow, or be associated, with immoral perceptions, leading to this willingness to publicly critique or derogate social groups.

The public expression of group directed attitudes seemingly plays both a constructive and destructive role in society. Throughout history, notable figures have spoken out against unjust or cruel group behaviors, instigating systemic change and improving wellbeing for oppressed groups. For example Martin Luther King Jr., Mohandas Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela all confronted the dominant social group of the time, and this confrontation and public exploitation of problematic policies led to growth and enhanced equality. However, history has also shown that public derogation of social groups can lead to unfair stigma towards certain groups, and can exacerbate conflicts between groups and nations, potentially leading to senseless violence (Leidner et al., 2013; Reifan et al., 2013). Because this public expression of negative attitudes can be such a powerful tool in changing individual and group behavior, it is necessary to investigate the mechanisms that lead people to make their explicit attitudes public. Although perceived morality likely plays a prominent role in this relationship, it is vital for future studies to continue to explore the factors that lead to these immoral perceptions, and the mechanistic steps in between that motivate the public sharing of group directed attitudes.

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Appendix A

Explicit Negative Group Directed Attitudes and Behaviors Measure for Study 1 and Study 2

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about liberals/conservatives.

Scale:

Do not at all agree							Very much agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

- I would privately hate liberal/conservative people just because they are liberal/conservative
- I would be annoyed if I was placed next to a liberal/conservative couple in a restaurant
- I would publicly use derogatory names to refer to liberal/conservative people
- I would make a joke about liberal/conservative people in the presence of a liberal/conservative person
- I would decide not to live with a potential roommate because the potential roommate was liberal/conservative
- I would choose not to let a babysitter watch my children if the babysitter was liberal/conservative
- I would urge my children not to date liberal/conservative people
- I would convince my friend not to invite liberal/conservative people to her party
- If I were a business owner, I would decide not to hire an applicant if the applicant identified as liberal/conservative
- If I worked for a catering business, I would decide not to cater for an event if it was for a liberal/conservative function
- I would support a law that states it is acceptable for police to question people in certain context simply because they identify as liberal/conservative.
- I would support a law that makes it difficult for liberal/conservative people to lead Boy Scout troops

Appendix B

Study 2 Manipulation Fictional Study Summaries

Moral Condition:

STUDY 1

In a study assessing the relationship between political identification and number of hours spent volunteering at homeless shelters in a large Eastern city, it was found that participants who identified as conservative or as liberal volunteered more frequently than participants who did not identify with a political ideology. In addition, participants who identified as conservative (or liberal) reported volunteering slightly more than did liberals (or conservatives).

STUDY 2

When controlling for age and income, this nation-wide study found that politically engaged individuals (i.e. individuals who highly identify as either liberals or conservatives) donated more money annually to local charities than non-politically engaged individuals. Additionally, conservatives donated the most money, followed closely by liberals. Both groups were higher in giving than those who did not identify with an ideology. Politically engaged people may be more invested in the wellbeing of community members than non-engaged individuals.

STUDY 3

This study used speech-analysis to investigate frequencies of discussion topics among people of various political ideologies. In a lab setting, participants were randomly assigned to conversation groups and were asked to share and discuss their interests. Politically conservative and liberal participants were more likely to discuss morally relevant topics (i.e., justice, fairness, equality), than sports, entertainment, or other topics. Conservatives were most likely to discuss morally relevant topics, followed by liberals, and then those not identifying with an ideology.

STUDY 4

In this study, a group of raters engaged in one-on-one conversations with over 200 target participants, and the raters' job was to rate their discussion partner on a variety of personality characteristics. Raters were blind to targets' political leanings; nevertheless, people of certain political leanings were perceived differently by the raters. Overall, conservatives and liberals were rated as possessing significantly more moral traits (honesty, fairness, trustworthiness) than people not identifying with a political ideology. Moreover, conservatives received slightly higher morality ratings than did liberals.

Warmth Condition:

STUDY 1

In a study assessing the relationship between political identification and number of hours spent at social events, it was found that participants who identified as conservative or as liberal were more likely to participate in social events than those who did not identify with a political ideology. In addition, participants who identified as conservative (or liberal) reported slightly higher attendance at social events than did liberals (or conservatives).

STUDY 2

When controlling for age and personality, this nation-wide study found that politically engaged individuals (i.e. individuals who highly identify as either liberals or conservatives) were more

likely to report a higher number of quality friendships than non-politically engaged individuals. Additionally, conservatives reported the greatest number of friendships, followed closely by liberals. Both groups reported higher numbers of quality friendships than those who did not identify with an ideology. Politically engaged people may be more invested in social connections than non-engaged individuals.

STUDY 3

This study used speech-analysis to investigate frequencies of discussion topics among people of various political ideologies. In a lab setting, participants were randomly assigned to conversation groups and were asked to share and discuss their interests. Politically conservative and liberal participants were more likely to initiate conversation and compliment others than participants who did not identify with an ideology. Additionally, conservatives were most likely to discuss positive and humorous topics with others, followed closely by liberals, and then by non-politically identified others.

STUDY 4

In this study, a group of raters engaged in one-on-one conversations with over 200 target participants, and the raters' job was to rate their discussion partner on a variety of personality characteristics. Raters were blind to targets' political leanings; nevertheless, people of certain political leanings were perceived differently by the raters. Overall, conservatives and liberals were rated as possessing significantly more warmth traits (nice, talkative, gregarious) than people not identifying with a political ideology. Moreover, conservatives received slightly higher warmth ratings than did liberals.

Appendix C

Study 2 Manipulation Summary Questions

Moral Condition:

Please answer the following questions about the study summaries you just read. Please do your best to answer accurately, as you cannot move on until you answer the question correctly.

1. Which social groups were examined in the studies to the greatest extent?
 - a. Religious groups
 - b. Political groups**
 - c. Ethnic groups
 - d. Socioeconomic groups

2. Which political group donated the most money annually to charities?

3. Out of the following people, who would be the most likely to volunteer?
 - a. A politically disengaged person who tends to vote liberal/conservative
 - b. A person who does not have a political orientation
 - c. A politically engaged person who votes conservative/liberal
 - d. A person who shuns politics

4. The studies generally found that liberals and conservatives were...
 - a. More morally good than other people, with liberals being slightly more morally good than conservatives.
 - b. More morally good than other people, with conservatives being slightly more morally good than liberals.
 - c. About as morally good as other people.
 - d. Less morally good than other people.

5. Which study seems to support the following statement most strongly:
Conservatives/liberals are moral? Please rate the studies from 1 to 4, with 1 being least convincing and 4 being most convincing.
(The study summaries will be displayed, and participants will choose the corresponding number (1-4) on a drop down menu that corresponds to their convincing rating)

6. Why did Study # *(display study summary again)* convince you most strongly that liberals/conservatives are moral?

Warmth Condition:

Please answer the following questions about the study summaries you just read. Please do your best to answer accurately, as you cannot move on until you answer the question correctly.

7. Which social groups were examined in the studies to the greatest extent?
 - a. Religious groups
 - b. Political groups**

- c. Ethnic groups
 - d. Socioeconomic groups
8. Which political group reported the highest number of quality friendships?

9. Out of the following people, who would be the most likely to attend a social event?
- e. A politically disengaged person who tends to vote liberal/conservative
 - f. A person who does not have a political orientation
 - g. A politically engaged person who votes conservative/liberal
 - h. A person who shuns politics
10. The studies generally found that liberals and conservatives were...
- i. Warmer than other people, with liberals being slightly warmer than conservatives.
 - j. Warmer than other people, with conservatives being slightly warmer than liberals.
 - k. About as warm as other people.
 - l. Less warm than other people.
11. Which study seems to support the following statement most strongly:
Conservatives/liberals are warm? Please rate the studies from 1 to 4, with 1 being least convincing and 4 being most convincing.
(The study summaries will be displayed, and participants will choose the corresponding number (1-4) on a drop down menu that corresponds to their convincing rating)
12. Why did Study # *(display study summary again)* convince you most strongly that liberals/conservatives are warm?

Kathryn Howard
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EDUCATION

Master of Arts in Psychology

Wake Forest University, Winston Salem, North Carolina
Expected graduation date: May 2017
Research Adviser: Dr. E.J. Masicampo
Cumulative GPA: 3.945

Bachelor of Arts in Psychology

Minors in Theatre and Anthropology
James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA
Graduation Date: May 2015
Cumulative GPA: 3.941
Summa Cum Laude
Honors College

HONORS/AFFILIATIONS

- Member of Association for Psychological Science, Fall 2016 - Current
- Member of Open Science Framework, Fall 2016 – Current
- Member of Society of Personality and Social Psychology, Fall 2016 - Current
- Winner of *Excellence in Senior Research* award, (JMU undergraduate psychology department award), Spring 2015
- Poster winner for best undergraduate honor's thesis at JMU, Spring 2015
- Phi Beta Kappa, inducted 2014
- Psi Chi, inducted Fall 2013
- President's list at JMU, Spring 2015, Fall 2014, Spring 2014
- Dean's list at JMU, Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Fall 2013

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Master's Thesis, Fall 2016 - Spring 2017, In-Progress, Adviser: Dr. E.J. Masicampo, Wake Forest University (WFU)

- A collection of studies, investigating the relationship between perceptions of immorality and outgroup directed prejudice and discrimination
- For one study, participants listed social groups perceived as immoral, unfriendly, or incompetent, and significantly more prejudice was reported towards groups perceived as immoral than unfriendly or incompetent
- A future study will manipulate enhanced perceptions of morality of real life social groups in an attempt to decrease prejudice towards outgroups

First Year Project, *When moral judgments breed hate: The effects of perceived immorality on prejudice and discrimination*, Fall 2015 – Spring 2016, Adviser: Dr. E.J. Masicampo (WFU)

- Study 1 manipulated perceptions of immorality, incompetence, and unfriendliness of a fictional group, and perceptions of immorality led to significantly higher endorsement of prejudice and discrimination than perceptions of incompetence and unfriendliness
- Study 2 measured perceptions of transgender people and African Americans, and perceptions of immorality most strongly predicted prejudice towards transgender people, and perceptions of unfriendliness most strongly predicted prejudice towards African American people
- Participants included Mechanical Turk workers and WFU students, and surveys were administered on qualtrics for both studies

Other Master's work: *False Impressions and Lies*, Fall 2015 – Current, Adviser Dr. E.J. Masicampo, WFU

- A series of studies investigating the severity of different lies in regards to the impression formation process
- Across two studies, personal lies regarding moral actions, (i.e., lying about volunteering) were rated as significantly worse and more immoral than personal lies regarding income, physical appearance, popularity, and intelligence
- Individuals who lie about moral actions are rated as more punishable and immoral than individuals who lie about physical attributes, monetary resources, and other personality attributes
- Participants included Mechanical Turk workers and WFU students, and all surveys were administered using qualtrics

Research Assistant for Summer Research Grant, Summer 2016, Dr. E.J. Masicampo, WFU

- A series of studies investigating the effects of first and third person perspective taking on inhibitory and initiatory self-control using an eating behaviors paradigm
- Researched theoretical background of perspective taking, visualization, and self-control in order to understand and help inform study design
- Assisted in creation of study design, protocol, and study materials
- Completed administrative tasks, such as the writing of IRB documents

Research Assistant for *The Beacon Project*, Fall 2015 – Spring 2016, Adviser: Dr. Michael Furr and William Fleeson, at Wake Forest University (WFU)

- A multi-study project that aims to identify morally exceptional individuals, understand the psychology of moral exemplars, and explore the true nature of morality.
- Assisted in creation of methodology and contributed to conceptual framework of several studies
- Assisted in measure creation, data collection, data entry, and analyses of several studies

Senior Honors Thesis, *The Impact of “Fearful” and “Serene” Mood on Mortality Salience*, November 2013 – May 2015, Advisor: Dr. Kevin Apple at James Madison University

- Designed, wrote, and conducted thesis using a Terror Management Theory framework
- Conducted experimental research on effects of fearful and serene mood on out-group derogation after mortality salience
- Presented poster at Honors Thesis Symposium
- Received a research grant to fund materials for this project

Research Assistant, August 2014 – May 2015, Dr. Matthew Lee’s Cultural and Racial Diversity Studies Lab at JMU

- Investigated transphobia, attitudes about affirmative action and potential teaching methods to promote greater understanding of minority groups
- Ran subjects and protocol, wrote protocol, collected and analyzed data, and presented research
- Composed IRB addendums, scheduled participants for studies, created surveys,
- Trained in SPSS, Qualtrics (online survey creator), and Sona systems (online system used to schedule and advertise studies)

Research Assistant, January 2014 – May 2015, Dr. Jeff Dyché’s Sleep research lab at JMU

- Measured the effect of sleep deprivation on alcohol consumption in rats
- Assessed risk taking behavior in sleep deprived rats, and measured signal detection in ADHD model rats
- Assisted in carrying out protocol, data collection, and maintained health of rats,
- Learned how to use operant chambers, sleep deprivation wheels, and how to administer intravenous injections to rats

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant for Statistics and Research Methods Course, Fall 2016 – Spring 2017, Adviser: Dr. Christian Waugh, WFU

- Currently teach a one-credit lab component of a research methods course that meets once a week for two hours to undergraduate WFU psychology majors
- Hold office hours once a week and meet students as needed
- Prepare class itinerary, power points, other teaching materials, and grade assignments
- Class consists of lecture, instruction, discussion, and guided lessons using SPSS
- Material covers bivariate inferential statistics, computation and analysis of statistics, hypothesis testing, research design, scientific writing, and SPSS

Field Placement Tutoring, Adviser: Dr. Joanne Grayson, JMU, Fall 2014 – Spring 2015

- For a one credit field placement course, visited an under-privileged child in the Shenandoah area for one hour, two times a week
- Helped with college applications, homework completion, life-skills, and comprehension of material including Algebra II, AP Psychology, English, and Government

Teaching Assistant for Abnormal Psychology Course, Spring 2014, Advisor: Dr. Pamela Gibson, JMU

- Advised students in Dr. Pamela Gibson's Abnormal Psychology class
- Held weekly office hours and assisted students with comprehension of material
- Taught several of the lessons throughout the semester
- Led review sessions covering all of the information throughout the semester

GRANTS AND FUNDING

- Travel Grant for SPSP 2017 conference in San Antonio, awarded by the Psychology Department at WFU, Fall 2017
- Graduate Teaching Assistantship full tuition and stipend, \$46,545, WFU, Fall 2016 – Spring 2017
- Summer Research Assistantship for work on Dr. E.J. Masicampo's studies regarding first and third person perspective taking and self-control, \$3,000, Summer 2016
- Graduate Summer Research Support, \$1,000.00, WFU, Summer 2016
- Summer Travel Grant for APA 2016 conference in Denver, \$300.00 awarded by the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at WFU, Summer 2016
- Graduate Research Assistantship full tuition and stipend, \$46, 545, WFU, Fall 2015 – Spring 2016

PRESENTATIONS AND CONFERENCES

- Howard, K.A. & Masicampo, E.J. (2016). *When moral judgments breed hate: The effects of perceived immorality on prejudice and discrimination*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, January 19, 2017, San Antonio, TX.
- Smith, E.L., Donovan, K.J., Howard, K.A., Takahashi, L.S., Yung, R., Roy, M.M., Uyguner, N., Mabrey III, P.E., & Lee, M.R. (2015). *Experience of discrimination by college students with disabilities*. Poster presented at the 124th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, August 5, 2016, Denver, CO.
- Lee, M.R., Roy, M.M., Bannar, E.S., Howard, K.A., & Waterfield, J. (2015). Reducing transphobia and including transgender issues in the classroom: What works best? Poster and talk presented at 9th Annual James Madison University Diversity Conference, March 16, 2015, Harrisonburg, VA.
- Bannar, E.S., Roy, M.M., & Howard, K.A. (2015). Reducing transphobia via classroom methods: What works best? Poster presented at the 123rd Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, August 6-9, 2015, Toronto, CAN.
- Howard, K.A. (2015). The impact of "fearful" and "serene" mood on mortality salience. Poster presented at the Senior Honor's Research Symposium at James Madison University, April 24, 2015, Harrisonburg, VA.

- Howard, K.A. (2015). The impact of “fearful” and “serene” mood on morality salience. Poster presented at the Undergraduate Psychology Symposium at James Madison University, April 20, 2015, Harrisonburg, VA.
- Bates, E.A., Bivens, D., Carnes, A., Cowan, C.M., Howard, K.A., Mangalmurti, N., Meccariello, M., Pointon, G., Rutter, D.M., Stewart, M.A., Ponder, K.N., Sequeira, S.N., Dyche, J., & Holt, D. (2015). Sleep deprivation and voluntary alcohol consumption in adolescent rats. Poster session and presented at the L. Starling Reid Undergraduate Psychology Conference, April, 2015, Charlottesville, VA.

Relevant Training and Certifications

- CITI certified for social-behavioral research at WFU (07/21/2015)
- CITI certified for research involving humans (completed: 08/29/2014)
- CITI certified for research involving small lab animals (completed: 01/13/2014)
- Completed a MED-PC course, learned how to write code for an animal operant box, (MED-PC is a coding language for operant chambers in behavioral research), Spring, 2014
- Trained to administer subcutaneous and intravenous injections to rats
- Have observed and assisted in rat euthanasia in CO₂ chamber

WORK EXPERIENCE

Tutor for Student Athletes, WFU Athletic Department, Fall 2015 – Present

- Tutor multiple student athletes several times a week
- Tutor a variety of psychology courses and English literature courses

Employee for Aramark Food Services at PC – Dukes, a dining hall at James Madison University, Fall 2013 – May 2015

- Cashier
- Food preparation and maintenance of facilities

Employee for Fairfax County Park Authority, May 2013 – August 2013

- Naturalist at Hidden Pond Nature Center in Springfield Virginia
- Worked at front desk in Nature Center, answered guests questions and managed cash box
- Fed and helped maintain the health of the animals living inside the center
- Helped facilitate “animal presentations,” for children

EXTRACURRICULARS

Psychology Service Organization, JMU, Fall 2012 – Spring 2015

- Served as Treasurer for this organization, managed the funding and bank account for the group, scheduled events and fundraisers, Fall 2014 – Spring 2015
- Organization composed of psychology students serving the surrounding Harrisonburg community and the greater Shenandoah area
- Hosted a Special Olympian event, called Day with the Dukes, provided buddies (JMU students) for approximately 60 Special Olympians. The day is spent

interacting with various JMU sports teams and ends with a cookout, Fall 2013, Fall 2014

- Volunteered for Habitat for Humanity, Fall 2014
- Volunteered at Sunnyside Retirement Community, lead BINGO nights, made holiday cards for assisted-living residents (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)

Study Abroad in South Africa, Advisors: Dr. Teresa Harris, Brian Augustine, JMU, Summer 2014

- Spent three weeks in South Africa with Honors Study Abroad class
- The course focused on Nelson Mandela and impact of apartheid in South Africa
- Completed volunteer work, taught science lessons to underprivileged school in Soweto, Johannesburg, also volunteered at an AIDS hospital in Pietermaritzburg

Theatrical Productions JMU

- Acted in four one-act productions outside of class, Fall 2011 – Fall 2013
- Actor in *Second Shepard's Play*, Fall 2011, *For Whom the Southern Belle Tolls*, Fall 2012, *Naomi in the Living Room*, Fall 2013, *The DMV One*, Fall 2013

REFERENCES

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